The Silence of George Tenet - 911 And The Israeli-Russian Connection

'Bin Laden Determined To Strike In US'
V
'Tenet Determined Not To Tell The Whole Story'

"I've got the best job in government"
George Tenet, Director of the CIA
'C.I.A. Chief Prospers From Bond With Bush'
New York Times, 17 December 2002

"Russian President Vladimir Putin has said publicly that he ordered his intelligence agencies to alert the United States last summer that suicide pilots were training for attacks on U.S. targets."
Clues Alerted White House to Potential Attacks
Fox News, 17 May 2002

"This provocative memoir by former top White House counter-terrorism adviser Richard Clarke was published on the eve of the 9/11 Commission hearings. His book is shocking and revealing, and should be worrisome for all Americans..... CIA Director George Tenet refused to arm an unmanned Predator aircraft to try to take out Osama Bin Laden... "
Against All Enemies - Book Review
Forbes, 15 April 2004

In This Bulletin

Tenet Keeps Quiet About KSM - Click Here

Tenet Keeps Quiet About Moussaoui
And 'Forgets' His Briefing Meetings With The President - Click Here

What Else Was The CIA Doing Before The 911 Attacks
That Tenet Can't Remember? - The Israeli-Russian Connection - Click Here

CIA Silence On Moussaoui Just The Tip Of The Iceberg - Click Here

CIA Strategy Not To Catch Bin Laden Too Soon
As Tenet And White House Pump Fear Of Terror Prior To Invasion Of Iraq - Click Here

"Eventually, someone's going to have to tell the truth. Once those people are dealt with according to law, there will be no more false terror spread across the globe."
FTW interview: Delmart 'Mike' Vreeland - What the CIA doesn't want you to know
Online Journal, 4 April 2002

"The ex-police chief told [CIA veteran and terrorism expert Bob] Baer that [Khalid Shaikh] Mohammed 'is going to hijack some planes.' The ex-police chief said his basis for this was evidence developed by police and Qatari intelligence... Baer sent this information [before 911] to a friend in the CIA Counter-terrorist Center who forwarded the information to his superiors. Baer heard nothing. 'There was no interest,' he said...."
UPI Exclusive: Pearl tracked al Qaida
United Press International, 30 September 2002

"KSM [Khalid Shaikh Mohammed] came to the attention of the Intelligence Community as a terrorist in early 1995 when he was linked to Ramzi Yousef’s 'Bojinka Plot' in the Philippines. One portion of that plot involved the idea of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters. Through additional intelligence and investigative efforts in 1995, KSM was also connected to the first World Trade Center bombing. He was indicted by a U.S. grand jury in January 1996..... Subsequently, indications were received that he might have been involved in the East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings."
REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 –
BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
24 July 2003

"Two veteran FBI investigators say they were ordered to stop investigations into a suspectedterror cell linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network and the Sept. 11 attacks.... even after the [embassy] bombings [in Africa], Wright said FBI headquarters wanted no arrests."
Called Off the Trail?
ABCNews 19 Dec 2002

"The head of the CIA [George Tenet] has told the 9/11 commission that ..... he did not speak to George Bush in the month before the attacks, when Mr Bush was on holiday in Texas. 'He's in Texas and I'm either here [in Washington] or on leave for some of that time,' Mr Tenet said in response to a question from commissioner Tim Roemer. 'In this time period, I'm not talking to him, no.' "
US was 'unprotected' on 9/11
BBC Online, 14 April 2004

"CIA Director George Tenet met with President Bush at least eight times in the 42 days before the catastrophic terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, a CIA spokesman said Thursday, correcting Tenet's testimony that he hadn't talked with the president during the entire month of August.... Tenet's contacts with Bush during that period are significant because the CIA director was the highest ranking U.S. official who was aware of both the FBI's arrest of flight student Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota and the CIA warning to Bush that Osama bin Laden was 'determined to strike' inside the United States. The CIA warning memo to Bush on Aug. 6, 2001, also noted that the FBI had detected 'patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.'.... Tenet learned of Moussaoui's arrest on Aug. 23 or Aug. 24 in a CIA memo entitled 'Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly,' investigators disclosed Wednesday.... Former Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard, who served as acting director for 10 of the 11 weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks, told the inquiry Tuesday that he had learned of Moussaoui's arrest in Minnesota on the afternoon of Sept. 11 -- after the attacks. Word of Moussaoui's arrest never reached the White House National Security Council's interagency Counterterrorism and Security Group, former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke testified on March 24. After the Sept. 11 attacks, FBI agents obtained the legal go-ahead to examine the hard drive on his laptop. It contained information on using crop-dusting airplanes."
CIA's Tenet did speak to Bush before 9-11, spokesman says
Salt Lake Tribune, 16 April 2004

"This provocative memoir by former top White House counter-terrorism adviser Richard Clarke was published on the eve of the 9/11 Commission hearings. His book is shocking and revealing, and should be worrisome for all Americans..... The revelations in this book about Tenet's inadequate response to the terrorism threat, in addition to what he subsequently said at the 9/11 Commission hearings, suggest that Tenet's resignation is long overdue. I am astounded that Tenet did not pass on his own staff's discovery that an Arab terrorist was taking flying lessons."
Against All Enemies - Book Review
Forbes, 15 April 2004

"If only Osama had faxed an X-marks-the-spot map to the [Bush] Crawford ranch showing the Pentagon, the Capitol, the twin towers and the word 'BOOM!' scrawled in Arabic....Only a couple of weeks after the endlessly vacationing President Bush got his Aug. 6, 2001, briefing with the shivery headline 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.,' the C.I.A. chief, George Tenet, and other top agency officials received a briefing about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui after his suspicious behavior in a Minnesota flight school. And that had another shivery headline: 'Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.' 'The news had no evident effect' on prompting the C.I.A. to warn anyone, according to the drily rendered report of the 9/11 commission's staff..... Asked by the commission member Timothy Roemer about whether he had shared this amazing news at a Sept. 4 meeting with Condi Rice, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Clarke — the meeting on Al Qaeda that Mr. Clarke had been urgently begging for since January — Mr. Tenet said no. Asked if he had ever mentioned it to Mr. Bush in August, during a month of 'high chatter and huge warnings,' Mr. Tenet said no. The Man Whose Hair Was Allegedly on Fire told the commissioners that he had not talked to the president at all in August. Mr. Bush was in Texas, and he was in Washington. Or he was on vacation, and the president was in Texas. After the hearing, Mr. Tenet had an aide call reporters to say he had misspoken, that he had briefed the president twice in August, in Crawford on Aug. 17 for a morning briefing he deemed unexceptional and again in Washington on Aug. 31. I'm not sure whether Mr. Tenet — a mystifyingly beloved figure even though he was in charge during the two biggest intelligence failures [911 and Iraq] since Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs — has a faulty memory, which is scary. Or if he's fuzzing things up because he told the president more specifics than he wants to admit. But in a town where careers are made on face time with the president, it's fishy that the head spook can't remember a six-hour trip to Crawford for some."
Head Spook Sputters
New York Times, 15 April 2004

"This War Against Terrorism Is Bogus" - Ex-Blair Government Minister - Click Here

"Israeli intelligence officials say that they warned their counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent. The Telegraph has learnt that two senior experts with Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence service, were sent to Washington in August to alert the CIA and FBI to the existence of a cell of as many of 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big operation...."
Israeli security issued urgent warning to CIA of large-scale terror attacks
Daily Telegraph, 19 September 2001

"At the same time that the FBI was getting close to investigating [911 hijackers] Alhazmi and Almihdhar, the Mossad, Israel's feared secret service, gave the US an urgent warning, according to recent reports from Germany. These reports say that on August 23, 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and said that they appeared to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. The list of terrorists contained 19 names. It is unknown if these are the same exact 19 names as the actual hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and were names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. It appears that a spy ring run by the Mossad had been closely following these terrorists for many months. In December 2000, Mossad agents rented an apartment in Hollywood, Florida, close to where Atta and Alshehhi were staying and attending flight school. They were closely spied upon until at least April 2001, when many of the Israeli agents were thrown out of the country. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02, Der Spiegel, 10/1/02, BBC, 10/2/02, Haaretz, 10/3/02] It has not been stated how the Mossad knew of Alhazmi and Almihdhar, but a Drug Enforcement Administration report on the Israeli spy ring internally released in June 2001 (and leaked after 9/11) noted the presence of Israeli spies in San Diego, California and Phoenix, Arizona at times when Alhazmi and Almihdhar would have been in those cities. [DEA Report, 6/01] Yet, apparently this warning and list were not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and also not passed on to the FBI. [Der Spiegel, 10/1/02]"
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: The 9/11 Hijackers Who Should Have Been Caught
Centre for Co-operative Research, 18 October 2002

"Odigo, the instant messaging service, says that two of its workers [in Israel] received messages two hours before the Twin Towers attack on Sept. 11, 2001 predicting the attack would happen, according to a report on Haaretz.com. The company has been cooperating with Israeli and American law enforcement, including the FBI, in trying to find the original sender of the message predicting the attack, said the report."
Report: Israeli Firm Got Warning of WTC Attacks
Newsmax, 8 April 2004

"Mossad chiefs insist the Israeli spy agency was tracking Osama Bin-Laden's terrorists in America before September 11 and that that the information was passed on to the CIA on Five separate occasions before the attacks on the WTC and Pentagon. As late as August 24, less than two weeks before the attacks, a Mossad warning, confirmed by German intelligence, BND, said that 'terrorists plan to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture.' The warning alert was passed to the CIA. The warning was also passed to MI6. The agency made its own checks and also informed the CIA. Frustrated by its inability to alert the CIA to an impending attack, Mossad arranged on September 1, according to Tel Aviv sources last week, for Russian intelligence to warn Washington 'in the strongest possible terms of imminent assaults on airports and government buildings.'... According to similar documents shown to the Sunday Express, Mossad was running a round-the-clock surveillance operation on some of the September 11 hijackers. The details, contained in classified papers, reveal that a senior Mossad agent tipped off his counterpart in America's Central Intelligence Agency that a massive terrorist hit was being planned in the US. A handful of the spies had infiltrated the Al-Qaeda organisation while a staggering 120 others, posing as overseas art students, launched massive undercover operations throughout America... The spying operations first came to the attention of the DEA in January 2001 according to a classified 90-page dossier which has been seen by the Sunday Express."
BUSH: THE IGNORED WARNING THAT WILL COME TO HAUNT HIM
GLOBE-INTEL - NUMBER :- 104 DATE :- 21/05/02

The Day After 911 The Following Two Pieces
Appeared On The Web Sites Of The Russian Newspapers, 'Izvestia' and 'Pravda'.
How Did The Russians Know So Much About The 911 Attacks Before They Took Place
And What Had They Told The US About Them In Advance?

"... According to our intelligence agents among terrorists there were at least two Uzbeks, natives of Fergana who arrived in the USA on forged documents about ten months ago.... The organization of the International Terrorist, according to Russian Intelligence Service agents had been planning an operation against the USA more than a year and a half."
RUSSIA WARNED US OF IMPENDING 9-11 ATTACKS
Izvestia (Russian Newspaper), 12 September 2001

"Generally it is impossible to carry out an act of terror on the scenario which was used in the USA yesterday. We had such facts too. As soon as something like that happens here, I am reported about that right away and in a minute we are all up [in our fighter aircraft]."
Commander-in-Chief of Russian Airforce, Anatoli Kornukov
Pravda online: 18:50 hrs 12 September 2001

Click here for more information on the Izvestia article which raises further controversial questions about how much the Russians told the USA before the attacks. It appears the Russians may have visited the CIA at Langley just two weeks before the attacks to warn the US government. And they may have provided very specific information.

"'We had clearly warned them,' said Mr. Patrushev, who is head of the FSB, the successor organization to the KGB. He added that their U.S. counterparts 'did not pay the necessary attention' to their warnings, the Interfax news agency reported."
Russia Gave 'Clear Warning'
Agence France-Presse, 16 September 2001

So Is Sharon Now Blackmailing The White House
Over The Failure To Act On Israeli/Russian Tip Offs
As Media Focus On 911 Commission Intensifies?

"During the two-and-a-half-hour lecture held at a Holiday Inn, Ruppert detailed the mounting and irrefutable evidence proving U.S. government foreknowledge of 9-11.... Ruppert detailed evidence that supports the conclusion that, while Israeli intelligence sources had learned of impending attacks, they promptly informed the U.S., which did nothing to stop them. Ruppert stressed there is no evidence to suggest Israel perpetrated the 9-11 attacks. Ruppert made it clear he believes Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s government may be blackmailing the Bush Administration, because the Israelis have evidence that the Americans had foreknowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks and did nothing to stop them. This blackmail, according to Ruppert, is what has given Sharon the leverage he needs to 'act like an 800-pound gorilla in Palestine.'.... Everyone in the audience stayed for the entire lecture, and most stayed in their seats for an additional hour-and-a-half to listen and participate in the 'questions and answers' part of the event. Ruppert said after the lecture he 'was pleasantly surprised that the questions indicated a general consensus that the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis in the Middle East was secondary to the broader issues of 9-11.'....."
Ruppert Addresses Private, Mostly Muslim Group in New York - Reports Israel Did Not Perpetrate 9-11 Attacks
Long Island, N.Y., April 30, 2002 (FTW)

"Ariel Sharon was smiling during much of his joint White House conference with President George Bush last night. He secured most of what he came to Washington DC for, perhaps more than even he had dared to expect. He had wanted public endorsement of the principle that the pre-1967 borders on which so many - and not only Palestinians - have long assumed would form the basis of any future settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, were not after all inviolate. And he wanted a clear public statement from the US President that there would be no right of return to Israel for the families of those who have been refugees for more than half a century. That he got both, not implicitly but explicitly, was made all the more surprising given that President Bush, mired in the intractable chaos and bloodshed of Iraq, might have been expected to be especially sensitive about anything which would exacerbate tensions between himself and Arab leaders. Certainly some of the more worldly officials in the Israeli government had expected that the President would indeed be so constrained that he would use opaque words where Mr Sharon would have preferred clear ones. Instead, Mr Sharon returns from Washington having secured a significant and remarkably open shift of US policy in his favour.... No one has ever fared well in contacts with Mr Sharon by underestimating his political wiliness. But the question remains: how did he persuade the leader of the free world to see it his way? "
How Israel persuaded leader of the free world to see West Bank entirely their way
Independent, 15 April 2004

"On August 26 [2001], FBI headquarters was notified by French intelligence that Moussaoui [Sept 11 hijacker suspect] had ties to the Al Qaeda organization and Osama bin Laden. Even this report did not spur the agency to action. A special counterterrorism panel of the FBI and CIA reviewed the information against him, but concluded there was insufficient evidence that he represented any threat, despite his refusal to answer questions and the French allegations. Moussaoui was not even transferred from INS detention to FBI custody until after September 11."
The strange case of Zacarias Moussaoui: FBI refused to investigate man charged in September 11 attacks
World Socialist Web Site, 5 Jan 2002

"At the meeting of al-Qaeda’s leading strategists and financiers were two young Muslim men. The CIA, which was tipped off about the meeting, failed to issue prompt warnings to the FBI or the Immigration Service about the pair and they slipped unnoticed into America on a flight to Los Angeles, using Saudi passports.... On September 11 they seized the controls of American Airlines Flight 77 and crashed it into the Pentagon."
After the biggest manhunt in history, no one has been convicted and only two face charges
London Times, 6 September 2002

"The CIA had information about three of the Sept. 11 hijackers at least 20 months before the attacks occurred but failed to pass the information on to other agencies, a congressional investigator said on Friday..... By the time the suspected hijackers entered Malaysia, the CIA knew al-Mihdhar's name, passport number, and birth information, and that he had a U.S. multiple-entry visa issued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia...."
CIA Knew About 3 Hijackers 20 Months Before 911 Attacks
Reuters, 20 Sept 2002

"In a further interview with Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio Springmann revealed more of his claim of a CIA operation which has brought large numbers of people from the middle east to the US, issuing them visas and training them to be terrorists. According to Springmann some of the September 11 bombers were granted US entry visas via the US consulate in Jeddah [Saudi Arabia] facilitated through arrangements made by the CIA (additionally Newsweek reported 15 September [2001] FBI information suggesting that 'five of the alleged hijackers of the planes that were used in Tuesday’s terror attacks received training at secure U.S. military installations in the 1990s.' ). Springmann suggests that those who died on September 11 may have been sacrificed in order to further wider US geopolitical objectives. In this respect the French newspaper Le Figaro reported last year that the CIA had met with bin Laden in Dubai in July 2001 and made no attempt to arrest him."
Finishing the Jigsaw Puzzle - Did Sept 11 victims die for Enron?
'Fight Smart' - 8 March 2002

"Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, suspected mastermind of the 9/11 plot, obtained a visa to come to the US just weeks before the attacks despite being under a federal terrorism indictment, a report by the federal commission investigating the attacks revealed on Monday.... Mohammed had obtained a visa to visit the US on July 23, 2001 — about six weeks before the attacks. He applied for visa using a Saudi passport and alias — Abdulrahman al Ghamdi — even though he is Pakistani-born and was not believed to be in Saudi Arabia at the time the application was filed, according to a portion of the staff report read by Susan Ginsburg, senior counsel to the commission. She challenged CIA Director George Tenet’s description of 17 of the 19 hijackers as arriving in the US ‘clean’ of activities that would arouse suspicion."
Officials missed 9/11 clues by whisker, says panel
Indian Express, 28 January 2004

"In a dramatic interview with ABCNEWS, FBI special agents and partners Robert Wright and John Vincent say they were called off criminal investigations of suspected terrorists tied to the deadly bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa. U.S. officials say al Qaeda was responsible for the embassy attacks and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.... The suspected terrorist cell in Chicago was the basis of the investigation, yet Wright, who remains with the FBI, says he soon discovered that all the FBI intelligence division wanted him to do was to follow suspected terrorists and file reports — but make no arrests.... 'The supervisor who was there from headquarters was right straight across from me and started yelling at me: 'You will not open criminal investigations. I forbid any of you. You will not open criminal investigations against any of these intelligence subjects,' Wright said. Even though they were on a terrorism task force and said they had proof of criminal activity, Wright said he was told not to pursue the matter.... Yet, even after the bombings, Wright said FBI headquarters wanted no arrests. 'Two months after the embassies are hit in Africa, they wanted to shut down the criminal investigation,' said Wright. 'They wanted to kill it.' ... The move outraged Chicago federal prosecutor Mark Flessner, who was assigned to the case despite efforts Wright and Vincent say were made by superiors to block the probe....'There were powers bigger than I was in the Justice Department and within the FBI that simply were not going to let it [the building of a criminal case] happen. And it didn't happen,' Flessner said. He said he still couldn't figure out why Washington stopped the case... On Sept. 11, 2001, the two agents watched the terror attacks in horror, worried that men they could have stopped years earlier may have been involved.'"
Called Off the Trail?
ABCNews, 19 Dec 2002

"Less than two weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks, FBI headquarters blocked an agent's request to aggressively pursue one of the future hijackers, a congressional investigator said in a report Friday. The agent warned, 'Someday, someone will die.' The unidentified New York-based FBI agent had asked headquarters Aug. 29, 2001, to allow his office to use its 'full criminal investigative resources' to find Khalid Midhar, one of two hijackers intelligence agents had identified as attending an Al Qaeda meeting in Malaysia in January 2000. In an e-mail, headquarters denied the request because Midhar was not under criminal investigation. It cited the 'wall' between intelligence and law enforcement. The agent replied: 'Someday someone will die - and wall or not - the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems.' ' The exchange was included in a report prepared by Eleanor Hill, staff director for the House and Senate intelligence committees' inquiry into intelligence failures leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks. Hill told lawmakers that the United States failed to pursue Midhar and another hijacker, Nawaf Alhazmi, who also attended the Malaysia meeting. Intelligence agencies 'had, but missed, opportunities both to deny them entry into the United States and subsequently to generate investigative and surveillance action regarding their activities within the United States,' she said. CIA interest in the Malaysia meeting faded after January 2000, gradually resurfacing after a participant was identified as being a principal planner in the October 2000 attack on the U.S. warship Cole in Yemen. CIA employees told congressional staff that the Malaysia meeting was seen 'as just one of many counterterrorist efforts' at the time. But intelligence documents show it was considered important enough to be discussed in briefings with the CIA director in January 2000. In March 2000, a cable from an overseas CIA station noted that Alhazmi had flown into Los Angeles on Jan. 15, 2000. The cable was marked 'Action required: None, FYI.' Midhar and Alhazmi lived openly in the United States."
FBI barred probe of future hijacker
Associated Press, 22 September 2002

"This Joint Inquiry confirmed that these same two future hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, had numerous contacts with a long time FBI counterterrorism informant in California and that a third future hijacker, Hani Hanjour, apparently had more limited contact with the same informant. In mid- to late-2000, the CIA already had information indicating that al-Mihdhar had a multiple entry U.S. visa and that al-Hazmi had in fact traveled to Los Angeles, but the two had not been watchlisted and information suggesting that two suspected terrorists could well be in the United States had not yet been given to the FBI. The San Diego FBI field office, which handled the informant in question, did not receive that information or any of the other intelligence information pertaining to al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, prior to September 11, 2001. As a result, the FBI missed the opportunity to task a uniquely well-positioned informant -- who denies having any advance knowledge of the plot --- to collect information about the hijackers and their plans within the United States.... During one of their last contacts, al-Hazmi advised the informant that he was moving to Arizona to attend flight training, but the informant did not advise the FBI of this information until after the September 11 attacks.... When the FBI’s San Diego field office determined after the attacks that a long-time FBI counterterrorism informant had had numerous contacts in 2000 with two of the September 11 hijackers, personnel there were immediately suspicious about whether the informant was involved in the plot. Subsequently, however, all of the field office personnel, including senior managers and various case agents, concluded that the informant was unwitting of, and had no role in, the September 11 plot... Several questions remain, however, with regard to the informant’s credibility.... the informant told the FBI that the hijackers did nothing to arouse the informant’s suspicion, but the informant also acknowledged that al-Hazmi had contacts with at least four individuals the informant knew were of interest to the FBI and about whom the informant had previously reported to the FBI. Third, the informant has made numerous inconsistent statements to the FBI during the course of interviews after September 11, 2001... In its November 18, 2002 written response to the Joint Inquiry, the FBI has acknowledged that there are 'significant inconsistencies' in the informant’s statements about these contacts. The FBI investigation regarding this issue is continuing.... The Administration has to date objected to the Inquiry’s efforts to interview the informant in order to attempt to resolve those inconsistencies. The Administration also would not agree to allow the FBI to serve a Committee subpoena and deposition notice on the informant... What is clear, however, is that the informant’s contacts with the hijackers, had they been capitalized on, would have given the San Diego FBI field office perhaps the Intelligence Community’s best chance to unravel the September 11 plot. Given the CIA’s failure to disseminate, in a timely manner, intelligence information on the significance and location of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, that chance, unfortunately, never materialized."
REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 –
BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
24 July 2003

"I, myself, still have two key questions today that I believe are important for this committee to answer. The detailed answers to them will deserve, and be afforded, the scrutiny of a nation, and must stand the test of time and exhaustive investigation. First, if the CIA passed information regarding Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi to the FBI prior to the June 11, 2001 meeting - in either January 2000 or January 2001 - then why was that information not passed, either by CIA or FBI Headquarters personnel, immediately to the New York case agents, criminal or 'Intel', investigating the murder of 17 sailors in Yemen when more information was requested? A simple answer of 'The Wall' is unacceptable. Second, how and when did we, the CIA and the FBI, learn that Al-Mihdhar came into the country on either or both occasions, in January 2000 and/or in July 2001 and what did we do with the information?"
Statement for the Record of Special Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation
on Joint Inquiry into the Events of September 11, 2001
Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives
20 September 2002

"Months before the Sept. 11 attacks, the CIA knew two of the hijackers were in the United States and that they were connected to the al Qaeda organization, Newsweek reported on Sunday..... for a year and nine months after the CIA identified them as terrorists, Alhazmi and Almihdhar lived openly in the United States, using their real names, obtaining driver's licenses, opening bank accounts and enrolling in flight schools. "
CIA Knew Two Sept. 11 Hijackers Were in U.S.
Reuters, 2 June 2002

"Under growing criticism for a failure to act on the Phoenix memo and other potential warning signs, Bush administration officials have said repeatedly that U.S. intelligence analysts never envisioned the possibility that terrorists would use jetliners as suicide missiles and slam them into such buildings as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon..... But a 1999 report prepared for the National Intelligence Council, an affiliate of the CIA, warned that terrorists associated with bin Laden might hijack an airplane and crash it into the Pentagon, White House or CIA headquarters. The report recounts well-known case studies of similar plots, including a 1995 plan by al Qaeda operatives to hijack and crash a dozen U.S. airliners in the South Pacific and pilot a light aircraft into Langley."
August Memo Focused On Attacks in U.S.
Washington Post, 18 May 2002

"Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States..... the Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat.... Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as the mastermind of the attacks, to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the United States.... the Inquiry confirmed that the Intelligence Community did receive intelligence reporting concerning the potential use of aircraft as weapons.... Some, but apparently not all, of these reports were disseminated within the Intelligence Community and to other agencies... KSM came to the attention of the Intelligence Community as a terrorist in early 1995 when he was linked to Ramzi Yousef’s 'Bojinka Plot' in the Philippines. One portion of that plot involved the idea of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters. Through additional intelligence and investigative efforts in 1995, KSM was also connected to the first World Trade Center bombing. He was indicted by a U.S. grand jury in January 1996. The indictment was kept under seal until 1998 while the FBI and CIA attempted to locate him and arrange to take him into custody. Subsequently, indications were received that he might have been involved in the East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings."
REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 –
BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
24 July 2003

"[There was] a climax of concern during the summer of 2001 about imminent attacks by Al-Qa’ida upon U.S. targets....the FBI knew about terrorist interest in U.S. flight schools and in the potential use of aircraft as weapons... The CIA was made aware of the Phoenix special agent’s concerns about flight schools, but it offered no feedback despite the information the CIA possessed about terrorists’ interest in using aircraft as weapons...."
REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 –
BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
24 July 2003

"U.S. and Italian officials were warned in July that Islamic terrorists might attempt to kill President Bush and other leaders by crashing an airliner into the Genoa summit of industrialized nations, officials said Wednesday.... Italian officials took the reports seriously enough to prompt extraordinary precautions during the July summit of the Group of 8 nations, including closing the airspace over Genoa and stationing antiaircraft guns at the city's airport..... the reports suggest that Western governments were aware that terrorists might one day use a hijacked airplane as a suicide weapon--as they did Sept. 11 in attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.......The Genoa warning was disclosed last week by Italian Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini..... In any case, the possibility of suicide hijackings has been known to U.S. counter-terrorism officials for several years...... In 1996, a terrorist captured in Manila told Philippine police that Al Qaeda planned to hijack 11 U.S. airliners simultaneously and to fly a plane into CIA headquarters near Washington."
Los Angeles Times, 27 September 2001

"In mid-July [2001], Tenet sat down for a special meeting with [Condoleeza] Rice and aides. 'George briefed Condi that there was going to be a major attack,' says an official ..... Tenet couldn't rule out a domestic attack..... One date already worrying the Secret Service was July 20, when Bush would arrive in Genoa for the G-8 summit; Tenet had intelligence that al-Qaeda was planning to attack Bush there. The Italians ..... closed airspace around the town and ringed it with antiaircraft guns. "
Could 9/11 Have Been Prevented?
Time Magazine Online, 4 Aug 2002

"Suicide bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaida's Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House. Ramzi Yousef had planned to do this against the CIA headquarters....Yousef was planning simultaneous bombings of 11 U.S. airliners prior to his capture. Whatever form an attack may take, bin Laden will most likely retaliate in a spectacular way for the cruise missile attack against his Afghan camp in August 1998."
'Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism'
US National Intelligence Council Report, Sept 1999

"On July 5 of last year, a month and a day before President Bush first heard that al Qaeda might plan a hijacking, the White House summoned officials of a dozen federal agencies to the Situation Room. 'Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon,' the government's top counterterrorism official, Richard Clarke, told the assembled group, according to two of those present. The group included the Federal Aviation Administration, along with the Coast Guard, FBI, Secret Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service. Clarke directed every counterterrorist office to cancel vacations, defer nonvital travel, put off scheduled exercises and place domestic rapid-response teams on much shorter alert. For six weeks last summer, at home and overseas, the U.S. government was at its highest possible state of readiness -- and anxiety -- against imminent terrorist attack. That intensity -- defensive in nature -- did not last. By the time Bush received his briefing at his ranch in Crawford, Tex., on Aug. 6, the government had begun to stand down from the alert.... As late as July 31, the FAA urged U.S. airlines to maintain a 'high degree of alertness.' All those alert levels dropped by the time hijackers armed with box cutters took control of four jetliners on the morning of Sept. 11."
Before Sept. 11, Unshared Clues and Unshaped Policy
Washington Post, 17 May 2002

"By the time a CIA briefer gave President Bush the Aug. 6, 2001, President's Daily Brief headlined 'Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US,' the president had seen a stream of alarming reports on al Qaeda's intentions. So had Vice President Cheney and Bush's top national security team, according to newly declassified information released yesterday by the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. In April and May 2001, for example, the intelligence community headlined some of those reports 'Bin Laden planning multiple operations,' 'Bin Laden network's plans advancing' and 'Bin Laden threats are real.'.... In January 2001, two surveillance photographs from the (al Qaeda) Kuala Lumpur meeting were shown to an informant who was helping both the CIA and the FBI. He helped them understand that Almihdhar was at the meeting with a man identified as 'Khallad' -- who by then was known to have planned the Cole bombing. But 'we found no effort by the CIA to renew the long-abandoned search for [Almihdhar] or his traveling companions,' the staff report noted. Also, contrary to the previous testimony of Tenet, the CIA did not tell the FBI about this discovery until late August 2001, according to the report."
Panel Says Bush Saw Repeated Warnings
Washington Post, 14 April 2004

"On June 11, FBI agents from the New York office and Washington headquarters met with CIA officials to discuss the Cole investigation. The FBI agents were shown photographs from Malaysia, but not given copies. One FBI agent later recalled that Almihdhar was mentioned during the meeting, and said he had asked the CIA why the people in the photographs were being followed. 'The New York agents were advised they could not be told why Almihdhar and the others were being followed,' the Joint Inquiry Staff report revealed. [New York Times, 9/21/02] 'The FBI agents recognized the men from the Cole investigation, but when they asked the CIA what they knew about the men, they were told that they didn't have clearance to share that information. It ended up in a shouting match.' [ABC News, 8/16/02] The FBI agents didn't receive the information they wanted until after 9/11. A CIA agent later admitted that he knew more about Alhazmi and Almihdhar than he told the FBI, but said he couldn't share that information unless he had the explicit authority to do so at a meeting specifically convened for that purpose. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02] As an aside, it's interesting to note that the CIA Director continued a pattern of denial, later claiming that this CIA agent told him the complete opposite of what the agent told the Congressional committee. [New York Times, 10/17/02].... The recent Congressional Intelligence Committee report on who knew what and when about Alhazmi and Almihdhar resembles more a whitewash than a true investigation..... For instance, up until June 2002, the CIA maintained that it had not learned of Almihdhar's connections to al-Qaeda or his visits to the US until August 2001. [New York Times, 6/3/02] But as is well-known now, these links had been established by US intelligence before the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. If it had not been for leaks and the diligent work of investigative journalists, this information would never have made it to the public."
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: The 9/11 Hijackers Who Should Have Been Caught
Centre for Co-operative Research, 18 October 2002

"Exactly two years before the Sept. 11 attacks, a federal report warned the executive branch that Osama bin Laden's terrorists might hijack an airliner and dive bomb it into the Pentagon or other government building.... The report noted that an al-Qaida-linked terrorist first arrested in the Philippines in 1995 and later convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had suggested such a suicide jetliner mission. 'Ramzi Yousef had planned to do this against the CIA headquarters,' author Rex Hudson wrote in a report prepared for the National Intelligence Council and shared with other federal agencies. The intelligence council is attached to the CIA and is made up of a dozen senior intelligence officers who assist the U.S. intelligence community in analysis of threats and priorities. The report contrasts with Bush administration officials' assertions that none in government had imagined an attack like Sept. 11 before that time...."
1999 Report Warned of Suicide Hijack
Associated Press, 17 May 2002

"Terrorists could not have carried out such an operation [as on Sept 11] with 4 hijacked planes without the support of a secret service."
Horst Ehmke, former coordinator of West German secret services
"Euro Intel Experts Dismiss 'War On Terrorism' As Deception"
American Free Press - 4 Dec 2001

CIA Strategy Not To Catch Bin Laden Too Soon As Bush Pumps Fear of Prior To Invasion Of Iraq?

"President Bush began secretly orchestrating a plan to invade Iraq just two months after the 9/11 attacks and worried he'd be skewered in public if his plans leaked, a new book charges.... The 468-page ode to Bush's run-up to war, authored by Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, includes several other explosive charges.... [including that] CIA Director George Tenet told Bush that proving Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was easy, calling it a 'slam dunk.'...''
Book: Bush sculpted war plan in '01
Boston Herald, 17 April 2004

"....we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace. We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy - the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints."
President George Bush
White House Speech Transcript, 7 October 2002

"FBI and military intelligence officials in Washington say they were prevented for political reasons from carrying out full investigations into members of the Bin Laden family in the US before the terrorist attacks of September 11.... the restrictions became worse after the Bush administration took over this year".
FBI claims Bin Laden inquiry was frustrated
London Guardian, 7 Nov 2001

"Dubai, one of the seven emirates of the Federation of the United Arab Emirates, North-East of Abi-Dhabi. This city, population 350,000, was the backdrop of a secret meeting between Osama bin Laden and the local CIA agent in July [2001]. A partner of the administration of the American Hospital in Dubai claims that public enemy number one stayed at this hospital between the 4th and 14th of July..... While he was hospitalised, bin Laden received visits from many members of his family as well as prominent Saudis and Emiratis. During the hospital stay, the local CIA agent, known to many in Dubai, was seen taking the main elevator of the hospital to go to bin Laden's hospital room. A few days later, the CIA man bragged to a few friends about having visited bin Laden. Authorised sources say that on July 15th, the day after bin Laden returned to Quetta, the CIA agent was called back to headquarters [i.e without arresting bin Laden]... According to Arab diplomatic sources as well as French intelligence, very specific information was transmitted to the CIA with respect to terrorist attacks against American interests around the world, including on US soil. A DST report dated 7 September enumerates all the intelligence, and specifies that the order to attack was to come from Afghanistan."
The CIA met Bin Laden while undergoing treatment at an American Hospital last July in Dubai
Le Figaro, 11 October 2001

"Mullah Haji Abdul Samat Khaksar, the No 2 Taliban official in U.S. custody, has been waiting months for the CIA to talk to him. The former Taliban deputy interior minister says he has valuable information for the U.S. - and may be able to help locate former Taliban leader Mullah Omar.... but no senior intelligence official has come for a full interview. The CIA will not comment... he says he has sent five letters to the US embassy in Kabul offering to pass on information about al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan... "
'The Taliban Guy the CIA Won't Question'
Time Magazine, 25 February 2002, European print edition, p21

"Thousands of American troops scouring Afghanistan for Mullah Omar have been looking for the wrong man, according to an Afghan villager who claims that it is his face on the CIA's wanted poster and not that of the fugitive Taliban leader. Maulvi Hafizullah, a former protocol officer for the Taliban, has been hiding in fear for his life in a remote part of southern Afghanistan since his photograph appeared as Omar on a CIA leaflet... Hafizullah has two eyes while Omar has only one, having been half-blinded in a Soviet rocket attack in 1986...."
'I'm not Mullah Omar' says the man on CIA wanted poster
Daily Telegraph, 13 October 2002

"This is the CIA's strategy .... you guys are in charge... we're just following you in..."
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of State for Defense, referring to CIA control over the war in Afghanistan
'The Inside story of US cabinet at war'
London Times, 23 November 2002

"US generals made it clear by the end of November that they believed senior al-Qa'eda operatives were inside Tora Bora. A convoy of several hundred Arab fighters, including bin Laden and his close associates, entered it from Jalalabad on the night of Nov 12, and the US bombing around the base intensified three days later. The US strategy bore little logic for those suffering the brunt of the attacks. 'When we round up a pack of stray sheep, we send in shepherds from four sides, not just one,' said Malik Osman Khan, a one-eyed tribal chief whose 16-year-old son Wahid Ullah was one of more than 100 Afghan civilians killed in the intense US bombing ....The eastern Afghanistan intelligence chief for the country's new government, Pir Baksh Bardiwal, was astounded that the Pentagon planners of the battle for Tora Bora had failed to even consider the most obvious exit routes. He said: 'The border with Pakistan was the key, but no one paid any attention to it. And there were plenty of landing areas for helicopters had the Americans acted decisively. Al-Qa'eda escaped right out from under their feet.'..."
Daily Telegraph, 23 Feb 2002

"Why has the CIA ignored for 11 consecutive months the only anti-al Qaida Pakistani tribal leader who had tracked bin Laden's movements ever since his escape from Tora Bora last Dec. 9? In late November 2001, this tribal chief contacted us via a mutual friend. He said his people knew where bin Laden was in the Tora Bora mountain range.... [Later] Bin Laden, he informed us, had indeed come out through the Tirah Valley on horseback two days before we got there, on Dec 9..... The U.S. intelligence community has been aware of the tribal leader's name and reputation, but did not contact him. ..... Members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board who were asked by us to ask the question [why this man was not contacted] have simply been told, 'We'll get back to you on that.' They're still waiting."
Conspiracy of silence?
United Press International, 18 November 2002

"This provocative memoir by former top White House counter-terrorism adviser Richard Clarke was published on the eve of the 9/11 Commission hearings. His book is shocking and revealing, and should be worrisome for all Americans..... CIA Director George Tenet refused to arm an unmanned Predator aircraft to try to take out Osama Bin Laden... "
Against All Enemies - Book Review
Forbes, 15 April 2004

"American warplanes have had al-Qaeda and Taleban leaders in their sights as many as ten times over the past six weeks, but have been unable to attack because they did not receive permission quickly enough, US Air Force officials complained yesterday..."
Pilots had leaders of al-Qaeda 'in their gunsights'
London Times, 19 November 2001

"[Northern Alliance commander] General Dawood said that Alliance intelligence sources in the city had reported that at least two large Pakistani planes had landed at Konduz airfield to extricate 'military personnel' on Tuesday night, followed by at least two more flights on Wednesday night..... Asked why the US, which controls the skies over Afghanistan, should have allowed such flights, he replied: 'That is a question that you will have to put to the Americans'...."
Alliance threatens to massacre Taleban's foreign fighters
London Times, 16 November 2001, p3 print edition (click here to access scanned image)
(on-line version excludes the question put to General Dawood)

"Pakistani fighters trapped in the besieged city of Konduz have been airlifted to safety in Pakistan with the apparent consent of the United States... The deserters are believed to have been joined by some retired soldiers, including operatives of Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s main spy agency....It is not thought that many of those who were flown back to Pakistan, including deserters, were detained on their return...."
US 'allows Pakistani fighters to escape'
London Times, 24 Nov 2001

"... in late September and early October [2001], leaders of Pakistan's two Islamic parties negotiated bin Laden's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for the September 11 attacks. The deal was that he would be held under house arrest in Peshawar. According to reports in Pakistan (and the Daily Telegraph), this had both bin Laden's approval and that of Mullah Omah, the Taliban leader.... Later, a US official said that 'casting our objectives too narrowly' risked 'a premature collapse of the international effort if by some luck chance Mr bin Laden was captured'.... And yet the US and British governments insisted there was no alternative to bombing Afghanistan because the Taliban had 'refused' to hand over Osama bin Laden. "
THIS WAR OF LIES GOES ON
Daily Mirror 16 November 2001

"The war on terrorism is a political myth propagated by the US and British governments, and we should not be manipulated by fear into believing or supporting them in this."
Remarks by Dr Jeff Sluka, Terrorism Expert, Massey University, New Zealand following the Bali bombing
Manatawu Evening Standard, 15 October 2002

"We now know that a blueprint for the creation of a global Pax Americana was drawn up for Dick Cheney (now vice-president), Donald Rumsfeld (defence secretary), Paul Wolfowitz (Rumsfeld's deputy), Jeb Bush (George Bush's younger brother) and Lewis Libby (Cheney's chief of staff). The document, entitled Rebuilding America's Defences, was written in September 2000 by the neoconservative think tank, Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The plan shows Bush's cabinet intended to take military control of the Gulf region whether or not Saddam Hussein was in power. It says 'while the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.'... In late September and early October 2001, leaders of Pakistan's two Islamist parties negotiated Bin Laden's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for 9/11. However, a US official said, significantly, that 'casting our objectives too narrowly' risked 'a premature collapse of the international effort if by some lucky chance Mr Bin Laden was captured'.... The whistleblowing FBI agent Robert Wright told ABC News that FBI headquarters wanted no arrests.... The evidence again is quite clear that plans for military action against Afghanistan and Iraq were in hand well before 9/11. A report prepared for the US government from the Baker Institute of Public Policy stated in April 2001 that 'the US remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma. Iraq remains a destabilising influence to... the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East'. Submitted to Vice-President Cheney's energy task group, the report recommended that because this was an unacceptable risk to the US, 'military intervention' was necessary. Similar evidence exists in regard to Afghanistan. The BBC reported that Niaz Niak, a former Pakistan foreign secretary, was told by senior American officials at a meeting in Berlin in mid-July 2001 that 'military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October'. Until July 2001 the US government saw the Taliban regime as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of hydrocarbon pipelines from the oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean. But, confronted with the Taliban's refusal to accept US conditions, the US representatives told them 'either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs' .... The 9/11 attacks allowed the US to press the 'go' button for a strategy in accordance with the PNAC agenda which it would otherwise have been politically impossible to implement. The overriding motivation for this political smokescreen is that the US and the UK are beginning to run out of secure hydrocarbon energy supplies.... A report from the commission on America's national interests in July 2000 noted that the most promising new source of world supplies was the Caspian region, and this would relieve US dependence on Saudi Arabia. To diversify supply routes from the Caspian, one pipeline would run westward via Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Another would extend eastwards through Afghanistan and Pakistan and terminate near the Indian border. This would rescue Enron's beleaguered power plant at Dabhol on India's west coast, in which Enron had sunk $3bn investment and whose economic survival was dependent on access to cheap gas... The conclusion of all this analysis must surely be that the 'global war on terrorism' has the hallmarks of a political myth propagated to pave the way for a wholly different agenda - the US goal of world hegemony, built around securing by force command over the oil supplies required to drive the whole project. Is collusion in this myth and junior participation in this project really a proper aspiration for British foreign policy? If there was ever need to justify a more objective British stance, driven by our own independent goals, this whole depressing saga surely provides all the evidence needed for a radical change of course."
Michael Meacher, former Blair government Minister - 'This war on terrorism is bogus'
The Guardian, 6 September 2003

Bogus War Against Terrorism - Why They Are Really Doing It
GLOBAL ENERGY CRISIS LOOMING
Click Here

London Times - 26 January 2004
World's Top Ten Oil Companies
Unable To Replenish Reserves
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/oilsectorfailstoreplenishreserves.htm
Sector Finding Less Oil - Pull Outs Anticipated

From Macedonia To Enron - Rice Must Explain Pre-911 National Security Priorities - 5 April 2004
American Sponsored Islamic Jihad In Yugoslavia - 27 March 2004
Is Bush Camp Preparing Another 'October Surprise' For The 2004 US election? - 21 March 2004
911 Inquiry Must Investigate US Military Command, Intelligence Services, and Cheney - 24 Feb 2004
Hutton And The Libyan Black Gold Rush - 8 Feb 2004
Hussein Kamel And The Big Anglo-American Deception - 4 Jan 2004
Iraq: British Government admits to 'Operation Mass Appeal' - 28 Dec 2003
Iraqgate 2003 - Dr Kelly and 'Operation Rockingham' - 19 Oct 2003
A Vision For Transforming America - 24 March 2003
This Is Our Prime Minister - 23 Feb 2003
What Is Happening To Britain And America? - 9 Feb 2003
The 911 Omar Sheikh Files - 2 Jan 2003
'October Surprise 2002' - Life After The US Constitutional Coup - 31 Oct 2002
What Did Britain Know About 911? - 28 Aug 2002
Why Did Bush Not Act On Sept 11? - 9 May 2002
World Peace Offered From Hiroshima - 22 April 2002
Did Sept 11 victims die for Enron? - 8 March 2002
CIA provided funds to financiers of Sept 11 bomber - 18 Nov 2001

A Vision For Transforming America - Click Here