NMCC COMMUNICATIONS ON 9/11

".... I don't know about the efforts that the NMCC made to make secure communication calls with the FAA. The FAA has the latest communication capability. I don't know who they called, but our intelligence folks were right there next to the operations center, and they have the latest equipment. So, I'm frustrated by that because I just don't know who they called or what that -- what that specific situation was."
Monte Belger, FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911
9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing

"In [FAA] Headquarters, Air Traffic Services set up an additional situation room in the front office that was occupied by DOD [Department of Defense] liaison officers who worked on the Air Traffic Services Headquarters staff.... At the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center, the military officers assigned to the Air Traffic Services Cell became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements."
Jeff Griffith, FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911
9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Written Statement

"..... there have got to be [communication problem] work-arounds. I mean, the fact was that FAA Headquarters did know about [Flight] 93 very early on, from 9:34 on. And if somebody [from the NMCC] had just picked up the phone to keep the connectivity open, it could have made a difference....."
John Lehman, 9/11 Commissioner and former Secretary of the US Navy
9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing

KEY MILITARY FIGURES
NOT AVAILABLE TO NMCC DURING HEIGHT OF 9/11 EMERGENCY

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with
preexisting training and protocols....."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

CORRECT CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR  MILITARY AIRCRAFT ESCORT ASSISTANCE AS PART OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGS ON  9/11 ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PROTOCOLS
FAA > NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTRE  > PRESIDENT/ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE > NORAD > MILITARY  UNITS
(for more details see excerpts from Department of Defense protocols - click here)

ACTUAL CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING COURSE OF 9/11 HIJACKINGS AS DIFFUSELY DOCUMENTED BY THE OFFICIAL 9/11 REPORT
FAA  > SECRET SERVICE/VICE PRESIDENT  > MILITARY UNITS
(for more details see excerpts from 911 Commission report - click here)

The 'Inconceivable' 911 Attacks

"..... isn’t it a fact, Sir, that prior to September 11th, 2001, NORAD had already in the works, plans to simulate in an exercise, a simultaneous hijacking of two planes in the United States..... That was operation Amalgam Virgo."
Commissioner, Richard Benveniste - Questioning NORAD officers
9/11 Commission Hearing, 23 May 2003

Prior to 911 the US military carried out an air defense training exercise in June 2001 called Amalgam Virgo 01 sponsored by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). A copy of what is alleged to be a proposal document for this NORAD exercise can be downloaded from the internet as a pdf file (click here). If correct (i.e. the provenance of the document is genuine) then this document is of considerable interest.

The stated exercise scenario theme in this document is 'Counter Terrorism'. Among the photographs on the front cover is one of Osama Bin Laden.  The document proposes that the focus be in three areas, one of which is 'Anti-airborne terrorism'.  Inside there are also some drawings of exploding skyscrapers. The graphic reproduced below depicting a hijack scenario is included at the end of the document. Although the civilian aircraft is shown entering NORAD airspace from the west coast its route is marked as traversing the full width of the US with the destination pictured as the Capitol building in Washington DC (the 9/11 Commission report confirms that the presumed target for the fourth hijacked plane on 911 was either the White House or the Capitol). The apparent proposed scenarios for Amalgam Virgo 01 are described as being based on 'realistic current threat'. For this particular exercise on the east coast of America it appears the hijack scenario may not have got beyond the proposal stage for 2001, with the actual exercise focusing on the cruise missile element of the proposal instead.

Irrespective of the status of the document referred to above, however,
a news release issued by the American Forces Press Service 4 June 2002 confirmed that pre-911a commercial airliner-hijacking exercise scenario was being planned for 'Amalgam Virgo 02', an exercise also confirmed at the 911 Commission hearings during questioning of NORAD's Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley by Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste. This information is, however, not referred to in the final report of the 9/11 Commission even though the related testimony was broadcast from the public hearings by the C-Span television network.

More details of such US military hijacking exercises are due to be published by Michael Ruppert, former Los Angeles Police Department investigator, in his new book 'Crossing The Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil'

Graphic From Penultimate Page Of
SEADS CONCEPT PROPOSAL
AMALGAM VIRGO 01
SCENARIO: COUNTER TERRORISM
1-2 JUN
Combined (Joint) Training for Unconventional Threat
(Note: SEADS=South East Defense Sector of NORAD
NEADS=North East Air Defense Sector of NORAD - the sector in which the 9/11 hijackings flew)
For more on Amalgam Virgo Click here

"Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the NORAD military command conducted a drill in which a hijacked plane slammed into a highly visible U.S. target. Details of the drill were not disclosed."
NORAD Trained for Hijacking Event Before Terrorist Attacks
Associated Press, 1 October 2001

"Air Force jet fighters could have intercepted hijacked airliners roaring toward the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11 if only air-traffic controllers had asked for help 13 minutes sooner, the head of U.S. air defenses said yesterday. The never-heard-before declaration by Gen. Ralph Eberhart [Commander of Norad on 911] stunned the hearings on the terror attacks .....'We would have been able to shoot down all three . . . all four of them,' said Eberhart, who was named commander of NORAD after Sept. 11....." on."
13 Minutes: Fed's Stunning Hijack Blunder
New York Post, 18 June 2004

"Gen. Ralph Eberhart, the commander in charge of the defense North America, told the commission that if the FAA had notified his office as soon as it knew airplanes had been hijacked, the military would have had time to shoot down the planes before they hit their targets."
Panel: 9/11 response confusion lingers
United Press International, 17 June 2004

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols.... As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes’ notice [from a source outside protocol] on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

Abbreviations

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with
preexisting training and protocols....."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

SUMMARY
CORRECT CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR  MILITARY AIRCRAFT ESCORT ASSISTANCE AS PART OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGS ON  9/11 ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PROTOCOLS
FAA > NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTRE  > PRESIDENT/ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE > NORAD > MILITARY  UNITs
ACTUAL CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING COURSE OF 9/11 HIJACKINGS AS DIFFUSELY DOCUMENTED BY THE OFFICIAL 9/11 REPORT
FAA  > SECRET SERVICE/VICE PRESIDENT  > MILITARY UNITs

"In my new book I will establish that.... on the day of the attacks [Vice President Dick Cheney] was running a completely separate Command, Control and Communications system which was superceding any orders being issued by the FAA, the Pentagon, or the White House Situation Room ......"
Michael Ruppert, former Los Angeles Police Department investigator
on his new book 'Crossing The Rubicon' to be published September 2004
From The Wilderness Publications, September 2004

Abbreviations

Flights - Location And Time Of Crash

9

"At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House."

More details of the role of Secret Service in the US government response to the attacks on 911 feature elsewhere in report (see below).

"As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was mandated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an air traffic controller’s perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance between airborne aircraft. Many controllers work at the FAA’s 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center, located in Herndon, Virginia, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of the National Airspace System. The Operations Center located at FAA headquarters receives notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings."

The report says that "Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States—and using them as guided missiles—was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11" .

This is directly contradicted by a report published in USA Today, 18 April 2004 entitled 'NORAD had drills of jets as weapons'.  One pre-911 exercise involved the World Trade Centre as a target. Another NORAD exercise planned in July 2001 and conducted later included hijacked aircraft departing from US domestic airports used as weapons. USA Today obtained written confirmation from NORAD that "Numerous types of civilian and military aircraft were used as mock hijacked aircraft. These exercises tested track detection and identification; scramble and interception; hijack procedures; internal and external agency coordination and operational security and communications security procedures."

The claim in the 9/11 Commission report that "the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government" is  misleading. The protocols specifically permit 'immediate response' launch of fighter aircraft without high level authorisation which may be obtained post launch.

On 911 the FAA's Boston Air Traffic Control Center contacted NEADS directly after making notifications within the FAA. This was the only notification of a hijacking that NEADS received on 911 during the course of the hijackings and it was received outside protocol. The instruction should have come from NORAD centrally after notification by FAA headquarters.

However, no such notification was made on 911 in relation to American 11 or indeed to any of the other hijacked planes. On 911 neither  FAA HQ nor NORAD central command issued a single request/instruction for airforce escorts during the course of any of the four hijackings. They only did so after the hijackings were over.

After Flight 77 went missing FAA local centres did not receive an all points bulletin instructing a search for primary radar targets. FAA headquarters executives continued discussions in relation to the suggested ground stop but appear not to have made the decision. The decision seems to have been taken by the Command Centre at Herndon.

25

"The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers 'observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed' and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service."

No primary radar tracking for Flight 77 is found until 36 minutes after its transponder is switched off.

Communication lines were open with the Secret Service at airport level.

This is a reference to NORAD centrally.

Meanwhile NEADS only found out that Flight 77 was missing when it placed its own call to the FAA's Washington Centre at 9.34 to ask about American 11 (p.27). In the process it was purely by chance that it found out about Flight 77. There was no notification to NORAD from FAA HQ as required by protocol.

As was the case with all the other hijackings on 911.

FAA Headquarters: They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don’t know.
Command Center: Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room."

Why did the FAA Command Centre not have easy access to those at FAA HQ responsible for making a decision about submitting a request to the NMCC for military support?

'Jeff' here may be a reference to Jeff Griffith, FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911 who gave a statement at one of the 9/11 Commission public hearings. His statement is not quoted in the final report despite its potential importance (see excerpts from his statement below).

Given that Mr Griffith has some potentially significant things to say about what happened at FAA HQ on 911, it is necessary to ask who are the "they" who are reported here as "pulling him away" to talk about United 93?

Mr Belger gave evidence at the twelfth and final public hearing held by the the 911 Commission.  Only one paragraph of his statement deals with the FAA's failure to communicate with the NMCC on 911 in accordance with protocols (although the protocols themselves are not mentioned). That paragraph states:

"Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA’s security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements. On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD. Although the FAA had letters of agreement with DOD and the FBI which defined procedures to follow and roles and responsibilities, it became clear that the events of 9/11 went far beyond the scope of those existing agreements. In the Headquarters and in FAA field facilities we were reacting to a real scenario that had not been practiced or modeled. Decision makers were reacting quickly, and in my opinion professionally in an untested environment."

Whilst the latter is an assertion which may be true in relation to FAA field facilities it is not self-evident in relation to FAA HQ.   An explanation is required as to why standard hijack procedures worked satisfactorily before 9/11 but not on 9/11 itself.  Once the first strike on the World Trade Centre had occurred, then never in the history of hijackings can the need to request military air support for the ensuing stricken aircraft from the NMCC have been more urgent or obvious. No such requests were ever made and no substantive explanation for this is offered in the 9/11 Commission's report.

Moreover the statement that "On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD", may well be true but does not constitute an explanation as to why not.

Under the established protocol (CJCSI 3610.01A) the FAA is required to communicate with the NMCC whose responsibility is then to set up the necessary communication link between NORAD and the FAA - a process which clearly worked satisfactorily before 9/11 according to Mr Berger's own testimony.

No mention is made in Mr Belger's statement of the FAA's failure to request airforce intercepts via the NMCC in this way at any point during the hijackings.

However, the statement does confirm that "The FAA security organization was participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies." No further information is provided about those conversations.

The role of the FAA security organisation is important because Mr Belger confirms that it "was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies."

No explanation is give as to why the FAA headquarters was able to communicate with "intelligence agencies" on 9/11, but not with the NMCC with whom it had communicated satisfactorily and "frequently" in the past during hijack alerts.

Mr Belger's statement confirming satisfactory  pre-911 communications with the NMCC is not included in the 9/11 Commission's final report.

NEADS only received an outside-protocol notification of the hijacking from the FAA Cleveland Centre after the hijacking had terminated.

NEADS is given credit for seeking out information, but there is no reminder at this point that they received no hijack alert instructions from NORAD command during the currency of the hijackings due to the FAA's failure to put in any requests to the NMCC. Neither is there any consideration of the failure of the NMCC to instruct escort mobilisation unilaterally in the event of the alleged but unexplained absence of a request from FAA HQ, despite the fact that the NMCC was aware of hijackings being in progress.

There should have been no need for NEADs to seek out information. The procedure set out in the protocols would have provided it to them had it been followed.

During the course of the hijackings fighters from Otis and Langley Air Force Bases were scrambled as a result of information provided outside the protocols - both following direct communication between the Boston Air Traffic Control Centre and NEADS (p.20, and p.26/7). Neither of these scrambles resulted from instructions that should have been issued by those senior levels of the FAA/NMCC which constituted the authorised chain of command responsible for initiating them.

In the final 9/11 Commission report very little is said about what went on at the FAA operations centre on 911. Despite its key function in receiving hijack notifications it is rarely mentioned by name in the report. Page 16 refers to its responsibility for receiving "notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings." Page 35 refers to its activity on 911, but the reference is passive. The NMCC contacted the operations centre and not the other way round (as should have been the case according to protocol).

This apparent lack of action by the FAA was referred to in a report of the New York Post, 18 June 2004 when commenting on evidence given during one of the 9/11 Commission's public hearings. The paper  stated that "During the hearing, a furious commissioner Bob Kerrey raised his voice and asked the FAA what the 'hell' had been going on."

Although 'security personnel' at FAA HQ had set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies the one organisation it needed to communicate with most, the NMCC, was not materially participating.

Who set up this line of communication that turned out to be a blind alley for the frustrated Mr Belger?

How is it that after a multi-million dollar inquiry the Commission is unable to establish who from the Department of Defense participated in the White House video teleconference?

Given that America was still under attack (and that by his own admission Rumsfeld was just gaining situational awareness even at 10:39 when he spoke with the Vice President) was attendance at the Pentagon parking lot the best use of the Secretary of Defense's time at this point? Rumsfeld gives an impression remarkably like that of a man endeavouring to delay his attendance at his command post for as long as possible.

This section of the report again confirms that FAA contact with the NMCC was not established due to "equipment problems". Who was in charge of the communications equipment at the NMCC on 911?

When a connection with the FAA was finally established after all the hijackings were over who was it that delegated an FAA official who knew nothing about the specific situation or general subject to join the conference call with the NMCC?

Meanwhile "the highest level defense officials" joined a NMCC line of communication on which the FAA was not available for the first 48 minutes.

The report doesn't tell us much about this, except in its separate Executive Summary when it is made clear what Rumsfeld did not do.  It states "The secretary of defence did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over."

Meanwhile both Secretary of State Colin Powel and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were out of the country on separate trips on 911. Air force General Richard Myers was the most senior officer in the county at the time. As such he was the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911 (as he confirmed during his own statement to the 9/11 Commission public hearings). Moreover Myers had already been nominated by the Bush Administration to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a nomination which was confirmed by the Senate on 14 September 2001. On the morning of 11 September Myers was in a meeting on Capitol Hill discussing his up coming confirmation hearing due on 13 September. An airforce fighter pilot himself by training, he stayed in that meeting for what appears to be around 3/4 hr or more whilst the hijacking crisis was in full motion. He was aware of the first strike on the World Trade Centre as he went into the meeting.

As confirmed by a Department of Defense press release 23 October 2001 Myers remained in the non-essential meeting until around the time of the hit on the Pentagon. 

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the two principal public officers designated to manage military assistance to civil authorities arising from terrorism or a threat of terrorism under Department of Defense protocols. Neither were materially available on 911 until the action was largely over. Yet according to a report in Newsweek 24  September 2001 on 10 September a group of top Pentagon officials had cancelled their own plans for travel on 11 September apparently because of security concerns.

However, apparently it was more important for the Presidential team to work on a speech for Mr Bush than it was for the Commander-In-Chief to liase with the Pentagon after the attacks began.

FAA Secret Service communication also continued at airport level.

This communications systems 'failure' is in addition to the one between the FAA and NMCC during the  'air threat' conference call.

What are the explanations for these failures?

This is one of the more remarkable aspects of the report - remarkable because so little is said on this subject.

However, one of the 9/11 Commissioners, Jamie Gorelick, let slip the following astonishing information in an interview with PBS, 17 June 2004 "On Air Force One, the president was unable to reach most of the people or at least many of the people whom he tried to reach. He could not functionally lead the government from Air Force One at a time of great national stress and national emergency."

From this description it would appear it was not only the White House that the President was allegedly unable to contact.And there it would seem the matter has been left to rest.

Yet either the President has lied on this matter to cover-up his own inaction on the day or some serious questions need to be asked of those in control of Presidential communications systems on 9/11. In the PBS interview Gorelick goes on to say that the problem has since been fixed, but she doesn't confirm that she knows what the problem was. What was that problem? If it's been 'fixed' then someone knows.

The Vice President is presented as being directly engaged with the President concerning the authorisation (and by implication the relaying) of the alleged shoot-down order.

However, nowhere in the relevant protocols is the Vice President referred to in the chain of command.  The use of 'lethal force' is a matter for the President and Secretary for Defense - who was apparently not available to the NMCC until after the last of the hijackings was over.

Moreover as reported by Newsweek magazine 28 June 2004 the staff of the 911 commission (although this is not recorded in the final  report authorised by the Commissioners themselves) have expressed doubt that the Vice President obtained consent for a shoot down order from the President. The staff's effort to have this reflected  in the final 9/11 Commission report was successfully blocked by the White House.

Why?

Why did the President not speak to the Secretary of Defense until shortly after 10.00  - around about the time when it was all over?

Why was their only discussion during the course of the hijackings a "brief" one? And why was it apparently so trivial that neither can remember its content?

Why was Rumsfeld not in the NMCC?

And why did he not have "situational awareness" until 10.39, more than two hours after the hijackings had begun and more than half an hour after they were all over?

In the 911 Commission Staff Statement No 6 (p27) some of the wording is broader: "As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not involved when the shoot down order was first passed on the Air Threat Conference".

After the hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit easily with the statement that "A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President."

So it remains undetermined whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice President. In either case questions of legality are raised.

"[Footnote] 103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.

The latter in fact has a reference number (CJCSI 3610.01A) although this is not quoted.

"[Footnote]  121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American 11, we compared NORAD’s response time for each incident.The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time.The Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In the case of American 11, the last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later. We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD’s reaction to the two incidents. See NTSB memo, Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers,'ZJX Timeline for N47BA accident,' Feb. 17, 2004."

In the event Stewart's jet eventually ran out of fuel over a non-populated area and no shoot-down was necessary.  However, the incident confirms that the pre-911 principle that air force scrambles are launched when a civilian plane loses ground communication and goes off course irrespective of whether or not there is a hijacking.

According to this footnote there was a 28 minute interval between the last communication from Stewart's jet and notification to SEADS (the equivalent of NEADS for that part of America).

This makes an interesting comparison with the 25 minute response time to the hijacking of American 11 on 911. However, it overlooks the fact that there was in fact no response at all on 911 for American 11 through the officially designated command chain (i.e. FAA HQ and the NMCC).

Moreover it is also reasonable to expect that ensuing notification periods would have been much shorter on 911 once the World Trade Center had been hit by the first plane (and certainly by the time it had been hit for the second time).  911 was a day of obviously much more urgent circumstances than those applying when Stewart's private jet went adrift in 1999 during which there was no indication of a national emergency or an escalating situation.

Yet in the event NORAD centrally received no notifications at all during the currency of the remaining three flights on 911.

American 77 made its last routine communication at 8:51 (p 8) and continued flying for around a further 46 minutes (although NEADS found out by chance it was missing a three minutes before it crashed: "The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance." (p 27)).

United  93 made its last routine radio communication at 9:27 and continued flying for around a further 36 minutes before reportedly being downed by the passengers. NORAD had had no notification.

In practice the Payne Stewart incident in 1999 was a dress rehearsal for 911. It was followed by open public discussion about whether it would be necessary for such an aircraft to be shot down if there was a danger it would crash into a populated area when it eventually ran out of fuel.  CNN confirmed that such a decision could be necessary and would require the authorisation of the President. At the time "a senior advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff did raise the question" according to CNN. Such a concept did not therefore arise for the first time on 911 as far as the national military command was concerned.

In fact Footnote 98 on p 457 of the 911 Commission report itself states "For the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, granted to NORAD but not used against Payne Stewart’s plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004)......" So this pre-911 shoot-down scenario has been confirmed by General Richard Myers himself who at the time was himself Commander in Chief of NORAD.

The Payne Stewart incident also involved an internal domestic flight departing from a US airport. Some have tried to claim, including the 911 report itself, that because in their view the most likely source of suicide hijacking flights would have been from external commercial flights the US military was not well prepared to respond effectively on 911 to hijackings of internal flights.   However, when a plane loses communication with ground control the alert process is the same irrespective of the departure point of the plane as demonstrated in the Payne Stewart internal flight incident. The fact that Stewart's plane departed from a US domestic airport did not prevent fighters being scrambled to investigate. The point of departure is irrelevant. The only point of relevance is whether or not the FAA/NMCC move into action when they becomes aware of a hijacking over US airspace.

When CNN covered the Payne Stewart incident in 1999  it reported that "Several Air Force and Air National Guard fighter jets, plus an AWACS radar control plane, helped the Federal Aviation Administration track the runaway Learjet and estimate when it would run out of fuel. And officers on the Joint Chiefs were monitoring the Learjet on radar screens inside the Pentagon's National Military Command Center [NMCC]."

It is interesting that the Pentagon were able to follow Stewart's plane using their own radar systems. Is it realistic to assume that such systems could only follow planes transmitting a transponder signal as opposed to using  primary radar instead? Developed intensively during the cold war Pentagon systems were built to aid the defence of the country. Were those systems really designed and installed on the assumption that enemy aircraft would conveniently have identification transponders transmitting to make them easy to follow if and when they crossed the US border?

"[Footnote] 167. For 9:53 discussion about scrambling aircraft, see ibid., p. 23. Neither Monte Belger nor the deputy director for air traffic services could recall this discussion in their interviews with us. Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004); Peter Challan interview (Mar. 26, 2004). Subsequently Belger told us he does not believe the conversation occurred. Monte Belger, email to the Commission, July 12, 2004. However, tapes from the morning reveal that at 9:53 a staff person from headquarters told the Command Center 'Peter’s talking to Monte now about scrambling.'  FAA memo,'Full Transcription; Air Traffic Control System Command Center, National Traffic Management Officer, East Position; September 11, 2001,' Oct. 21, 2003, p. 23. For discussions about the status of United 93, see ibid., pp. 24–27."

The footnote makes it clear that this version of events is not supported by either of the alleged participants to the conversation, although it seems the Commission has decided to convey this version of events as the 'true' account of what happened on 9/11 in the main report (It is not clear who Peter Challan is. The FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911was Jeff Griffith who gave evidence during the Commission's public hearings. References elsewhere would seem to indicate that Challan is or was Deputy Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services).

Who was the person at the FAA who reported that this conversation took place, when it is denied by both of those who are alleged to have engaged in it? Why has the conversation been denied by those who are alleged to have participated in it? And why is the denial only reported in a footnote provided over 400 pages later in the report?

If the denial is correct then the Command Centre could have been misled into believing that its request for a military escort was being dealt with, when in fact it wasn't. If so then presumably once informed of this the Command Centre would have believed it was not necessary to reiterate its request.

Who is Mr Gonslaves and what further insights might he be able to provide as to what happened on 911?

Yet even after Rumsfeld and Myers eventually made themselves available to the NMCC at around 10:00 and 10:30 respectively on 9/11 it appears they spent very little time interacting with it  - by protocol the NMCC is the key organ concerned with the authorisation of any military response to hijackings.

[Footnote] 208. "USSS [United States Secret Service] memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001,p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004).

The footnote says "A senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA". Although the location is not stated it seems likely that this 'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the organisation which failed to make any requests for military assistance on 911 as required by established protocols.

Was FAA HQ (if that's who was involved here) lead to believe by the Secret Service that informing them of the situation was sufficient for NORAD to be informed or was the Secret Service only communicating with the FAA concerning, for example, the security of Air Force One?

Who in the Secret Service's operation centre was responsible for not passing on or disseminating the information about hijacked planes provided in this way by the FAA?

Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen?

Who is the "Chuck Green" mentioned here? He is not referred to in the report other than in the footnotes.

According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 "The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection, both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had their transponders turned off." Although this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the early stages of the first hijacking.

Investigative journalist Tom Flocco had been a regular attendee at the Commission's public hearings. In an online article 17 June 2004 he reported that: "President Bush is attended by a round-the-clock Secret Service detail which would of necessity been connected to the secure phone bridge conference lines. Most Americans think that President Bush first became aware of the attacks when his Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered in his ear at 9:06 am at the elementary school while he was meeting with the first graders. Facts indicate otherwise. Laura Brown, Public Affairs Director at the FAA, initially told this writer at the first 9-11 hearing in Washington that the phone bridges started around 8:20 or 8:25 am, which would be reasonable since American 11 was determined to be hijacked at 8:13, 8:20 or 8:24 am. This, depending upon which news report, official, or air traffic controller is referenced--and to what extent one permits the government to shorten the official time-line of the actual attacks, thus reducing potential culpability should a grand jury ever be impaneled. After returning to her office and conferring with superiors, Brown sent an email to this writer later that same evening after 7:00 pm, revising her initial assertions for the commencement of Leidig’s phone bridges to around 8:45 am, thus shortening the official attack time-line to the government's advantage."

Bush was attending a school in Sarasota, Florida, on 911. According to the November 2001 edition of Sarasota Magazine which was covering the Presidential visit for the local community: "[On the morning of 911] After a four-and-a-half mile run, the President returned to the Colony and showered. He left promptly at 8:35 but not before thanking the Klaubers and the Colony staff, each member personally when possible. The motorcade set out and soon disappeared southward on Gulf of Mexico Drive. The President was on Highway 301, just north of Main Street, heading toward Booker Elementary when, on the phone that Katie Moulton had been admiring just hours before, he received the news that a plane had crashed in New York City. A ride on Air Force One is usually one of the more pleasant perks that members of Congress enjoy. Bradenton’s Congressman Dan Miller had experienced the pleasure three times before. As a Presidential courtesy, it transcends party. Miller, a Republican, had last flown aboard the fabled jet, probably the most famous plane in the world, as the guest of President Clinton. Miller and his wife Glenda had been in Washington for the weekend, but he flew back to his Bradenton home on Monday night. At 8:55 Tuesday morning he was standing in front of Emma E. Booker Elementary School as part of the official greeting party, along with Congressman Adam Putnam. An aide had just whispered to Miller the news of the first plane crash in New York, but if the President yet knew, his greeting as he got out of the limo did not give it away. He did, however, make an unscheduled stop in a communications room, where he talked with Condoleeza Rice in Washington. He then proceeded into a classroom where 16 second graders, led by their teacher, Sandra K. Daniels, were going to demonstrate their reading skills."

The report in various places refers to documents which are not available to the public.

However, it is apparent that the FAA's involvement with the Secret Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the NMCC which appears to have been minimal during the course of the hijackings.

Second Public Hearing

(Of the twelve pages of the statement four deal with what Norman Mineta did on 911 itself)

"On Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, I was meeting with the Belgian Transport Minister in my conference room adjacent to my office discussing liberalizing the status of aviation agreements between the United States and Belgium. Because of the agenda, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey was also in attendance.... A little after 8:45 AM, my Chief of Staff, John Flaherty, interrupted the meeting, and asked Administrator Garvey and me to step into my office where he told me that news reports were reporting that some type of aircraft had flown into one of the towers of New York's World Trade Center. Information was preliminary, so we did not know what kind of aircraft nor whether or not it was intentional. Jane Garvey had immediately gone to a telephone and contacted the FAA operations center. I asked to be kept informed of any developments and returned to the conference room to explain to the Belgian Prime Minister that our meeting might have to be postponed.... In major incidents it [the Office of the Secretary] will follow a protocol of notification that includes the White House and other agencies that could be involved in the incident. These activities, albeit in their nascent stage of information gathering, began to take place in these intial moments. A few minutes after my return to the conference room, my Chief of Staff, again asked me to step back into my office. He told me that the aircraft was a commercial aircraft, and that the FAA had received an unconfirmed report that a hijacking of an American Airlines flight had occured. While Mr. Flaherty and I were discussing the information, I watched as a large commercial jet flew into the second tower of the World Trade Center. At this point, things began to happen quickly. I once more returned to the conference room and informed the Minister of what had happened and ended the meeting. I received a telephone call from the CEO of United Airlines, Jack Goodwin, telling me that one of United's flights was missing. I called Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines and asked him to see if American Airlines could account for all of its airplanes. Mr. Flaherty reported to me that Jane Garvey had phoned to report that the CEO of Delta Airlines had called the FAA and said it could not yet account for all of its aircraft. During this time my office activated the Department's Crisis Management Center which is located on the eighth floor of the DOT headquarters building and provides for senior DOT personnel to conduct surge operations in a coordinated manner.  By this time my office had contacted the White House. A brief moment later, the White House called my Chief of Staff and asked if I could come to the White House and operate from that location. I decided that given the nature of the attack, I should be at the White House directly providing the President and the Vice President with information. Given how relatively soon it was after the attack, I assessed I could travel to the White House quickly and without delay. When I got to the White House it was being evacuated, I met briefly with Richard Clark, a National Security Council staff member who had no new information, before the Secret Service escorted me down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC). I established contact on two lines, one with my Chief of Staff at DOT and the second with Monte Belger, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the FAA, and Jane Garvey both of whom were in the FAA operations center by this time."

Several points arise from this account from Norman Mineta:

1. Unlike General Myers even after the fist plane hit the WTC Mineta acknowledged the potential need to cease his non-essential meeting (albeit with a minister from a foreign country) in order to attend to the emergency, and at that point he asked to be kept informed of developments.
2. Before the second strike on the WTC it was known at the highest levels of the US Department of Transportation that the first strike involved a commercial airliner and that an unconfirmed report of a hijacking of an American Airlines flight had been received.
3. Mineta watched the second strike on the WTC live on TV.
4. After this Mineta was summoned away from his Department to the White House. Prior to this Mineta was personally active in direct conversations with United Airlines and American Airlines about their aircraft that had gone missing.

"During my tenure at FAA, my staff and I interacted routinely with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. We were advised of current and possible future threats against civil aviation and worked actively to implement measures to protect the flying public against those threats. Throughout 2001, as the intelligence reporting volume increased, the overwhelming majority was focused on likely targets overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Throughout this period, my office issued at least 15 Information Circulars to authorized aviation industry security professionals- corporate security directors, senior management personnel, ground security coordinators, supervisory personnel at overseas locations and as appropriate, to local airline managers and law enforcement personnel on a need-to-know basis. Often times, these were issued in concert with Department of State public announcements and FBI National Law Enforcement Transmittals. Information Circulars contained data derived from law enforcement and intelligence information focusing on domestic and international terrorism threats directed against aviation. The Information Circulars updated U.S. carriers against continuing violence against American citizens and interests around the world, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East, and encouraged airlines to practice a high degree of awareness. For example, one Information Circular described the plot to target a public area in the Los Angeles Airport terminal by Ahmed Ressam- who was arrested in December 1999 while attempting to enter the United States from Canada.... As I recall, the threat reporting during early to mid-2001 centered on U.S. targets abroad. In June and July 2001, the FAA was included in many interagency Counterterrorism Security Group meetings, held at the White House by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, regarding possible attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Europe. In early July, the NSC chaired a meeting at which the interagency was briefed about additional intelligence indicating that terrorist attacks seemed imminent; the Intelligence Community briefers emphasized attacks would likely take place overseas. While we all agreed that attacks within the U.S. would not be ruled out, there was no indication from the Intelligence Community that attacks focused specifically against airlines. Nonetheless, the entire CT [counter terrorism] community, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, were placed on highest alert and we all sent out notifications for heightened security measures to be put in place immediately. The FAA sent out SD's and IC's to all interested parties."

Although General Cavanan reports that most threat warnings issued by the FAA related to the Middle East during the summer of 2001, one circular specifically referred to a previous plot to target a public area in the Los Angeles Airport terminal. Canavan also confirms that intelligence reporting volume was increasing throughout 2001.

Threat circulars were issued to local airline managers as well as overseas personnel. The circulars focused on both domestic as well as international "terrorism threats directed against aviation".

Canavan lays particular emphasis on threat reporting relating to overseas targets made at the White House meetings during June and July. However, a report of one of those meetings attended by the FAA in July 2001 published in the Washington Post 17 May 2002 describes how White House counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke was of the view that attacks were going to take place in the US. Clarke said "Something spectacular is going to happen, and its going to happen here soon".

Nonetheless Canavan confirms that the FAA was placed on highest alert during June and July. If so it is not clear why its lines of communication with the NMCC were not properly established by the time of 911, particularly as General Myers confirmed in his own evidence to the Commission's public hearings that the NMCC "serves as our worldwide monitoring crisis response center".

"During my May 22 testimony before the Commission, I was questioned about the FAA’s knowledge, prior to September 11, of intelligence reports regarding the use of commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction. The Commission cited several such reports. The staff of the former FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, which as been subsumed into the Transportation Security Administration, previously prepared a detailed, classified statement regarding those reports for the Joint Inquiry of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Hopefully, that statement answers most of the Commission’s questions regarding those reported episodes. I do not specifically address the incidents here. Instead, I wish to provide brief, general comments to the Commission regarding the FAA’s intelligence capabilities on September 11.... Prior to September 11, the intelligence provided to the FAA did not support a conclusion that there was any specific, credible threat of terrorists using aircraft as suicide weapons for attacks against the United States. This conclusion should not be construed as a failure to maintain a high level of vigilance. The FAA was aware of numerous, more traditional terrorist threats prior to September 11, and constantly warned airlines and airports about those threats, as well as adjusting countermeasures when warranted. The FAA and the intelligence community itself, believed that these more traditional terrorist threats – the bombing of aircraft, and hijacking and hostage taking – posed the more likely threats to aviation."

Ms Garvey's testimony of 22 May 2003 states that "following the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 it became obvious that the general terrorist threat in the United States had increased. It was not immediately clear what the threat might be with respect to domestic civil aviation but evaluation of the intelligence that continued to come in drove the FAA Office of Intelligence to the conclusion that some terrorist groups were preoccupied with the idea of attacking civil aviation and that, in fact the domestic threat to civil aviation had, in fact, increased.... We wish we had received the FBI/Phoenix memo on flight school students - and it would have worried us a lot - but we did not."

It appears that some or all of the FAA's statement on pre-911 intelligence reporting  provided to previous congressional Joint Inquiry investigations may remain 'classified'.

The initial response to a hijacking of any kind is to launch fighter escort aircraft. This is the same for both conventional hijackings and those of the suicide type executed on 911. Ms Garvey does not explain why FAA headquarters did not request fighter escorts on 911.

This anomaly is particularly difficult to understand given Ms Garvey's acknowledgement of the FAA's pre-911 recognition of the risk of  "more traditional" hijackings and the resulting "constant" warnings to airlines and adjustment of "counter measures".

"The statement of Ms. Jane Garvey, former Administrator of the FAA, to the Commission on May 22, 2003, summarized the development of the national aviation security program from its beginning..... I will try to avoid repeating these excellent summaries..... From 1993 to 2000, aviation security was implemented in an environment shaped by several developments and events: memory of the Pan Am 103 catastrophe and national determination that nothing like it should happen again; the World Trade Center bombing of February 1993 and the discovery, in the post-bombing investigations, of previously un-noticed groups within the United States that at least seemed to be connected with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations; the 'Manila Conspiracy', also called the 'Bojinka Plot', that aimed in early 1995 to destroy as many as twelve U.S. airliners nearly simultaneously as they flew from airports in East Asia; growing awareness of the al Qaeda terrorist organization; and the crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, which initially appeared to have been caused by an on-board bomb and thus raised national awareness of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States. The investigations stemming from the World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States. Because of that, and because Middle East-connected terrorists had a propensity to attack aviation, additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments, at first only for a time around salient events such as the sentencing of World Trade Center terrorists. Later in 1995, the measures were re-implemented with some changes, and kept in effect.... By 1995, the FAA had become convinced that the baseline of aviation security, the aggregate of the permanent carrier and airport programs, had to be raised.....With the support of the Secretary of Transportation and the National Security Council staff, the FAA determined that its Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was the forum in which to achieve the consensus for a new baseline. The ASAC met and formed the Baseline Working Group on July 17, 1996. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Mortimer Downey and Congressman James Oberstar addressed the ASAC and strongly endorsed raising aviation security in this manner. The destruction of TWA flight 800, which followed the Baseline Working Group’s creation by only a few hours, accelerated a process already underway. President Clinton formed the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security on July 25. Its members included the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI...... If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligence agencies knew them, the attacks could have been disrupted, perhaps completely defeated, simply by requiring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to law enforcement agencies. "

Nonetheless Admiral Flynn confirms FAA pre-911 awareness that "The investigations stemming from the [1993] World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States." Because of that "additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments"although these are not elucidated here.

He confirms FAA pre-911 awareness of "previously un-noticed groups within the United States that at least seemed to be connected with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations" and of "of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States."

It is clear from these remarks that the potential for attacks on aviation launched from within the United States was recognised by the FAA pre-911.

The last major airline security event within the US was in 1996 (TWA flight 800) which accelerated a review of aviation security.

Admiral Flynn bluntly states that "If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligence agencies knew them, the attacks could have been disrupted, perhaps completely defeated, simply by requiring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to law enforcement agencies."

In this respect a report in the New York Times 25 March 2004 is relevant. It states "Reprising the scene in the White House on 9/11, [head of counter terrorism  Richard] Clarke says he took a call from Dale Watson, the FBI's counterterrorism chief. 'We got the passenger manifests from the airlines,' Watson said. 'We recognize some names, Dick. They're al-Qaida.' Clarke recalled: 'I was stunned, not that the attack was al-Qaida but that there were al-Qaida operatives on board aircraft using names that FBI knew were al-Qaida.' Watson told Clarke that 'CIA forgot to tell us about them.'"

This statement sets out the degree to which the FAA was reliant on external US intelligence agencies (CIA, FBI etc) for anticipating potential terrorist threats to US civil aviation.

Eighth Public Hearing

(Of the 23 page testimony one is devoted to what Rumsfeld did on 911)

"On the morning of September 11, 2001, I was hosting a meeting for some of Members of Congress. Ironically, in the course of the conversation, I stressed how important it was for our country to be adequately prepared for the unexpected. Someone handed me a note that a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center Towers. Later, I was in my office with a CIA briefer when I was told a second plane had hit the other tower. Shortly thereafter, at 9:38 AM, the Pentagon shook with an explosion of a then unknown origin. I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long, apparently, because I am told I was back in the Pentagon, with a crisis action team, by shortly before or after 10:00 AM. Upon my return from the crash site and before going to the Executive Support Center (ESC), I had one or more calls in my office, one of which I believe was with the President. I left the ESC and went to the National Military Command Center where General Dick Myers, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had just returned from Capitol Hill. We discussed and I recommended to the President raising the U.S. Defense Condition level from 5 to 3, and increasing the Force Protection level..... In the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I joined the air threat telephone conference call in progress. One of my first conversations during the conference call was with the Vice President. He informed me of the President’s authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming toward Washington, D.C. My thoughts went to the pilots of the U.S. military aircraft that could be called upon to execute that order. I recalled an experience in 1975, while I was serving as White House Chief of Staff, when the ship Mayaguez was seized by pirates. During that incident, communications had been beamed into a room where President Ford and the rest of us could hear U.S. pilots as they weighed intercepting a boat moving from an island to the mainland -- very likely with the crew of the Mayaguez as captives..... I spent the remainder of the morning and into the afternoon in the NMCC and the ESC, participating in the Air Threat Conference, talking to the President or Vice President, or giving guidance and thinking about the way forward. During the course of the day, the President indicated he expected us to provide him with robust options for military responses."

We do know, however, that Rumsfeld did not join the NMCC air threat conference until just before 10:30 and that he claims he did not have 'situational awareness' until around 10.39 (p 44 of  9/11 Commission report).

Even after he was informed of the first strike on the WTC it would appear that Rumsfeld preferred to continue meeting with a CIA briefer until the Pentagon was hit, after which he went outside to inspect the damage (according to the 9/11 Commission report, p 37, the meeting was "his daily intelligence briefing". In other words it was a routine meeting).

At no point during this time does it appear that Rumsfeld was coordinating a military response to the attacks. According to the Commission's Executive summary separate to the main report: "The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over."

The relevant protocol states, however, that:
"The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism may be requested only by the President (or in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives) and must be authorized by the President. All requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must also be approved by the Secretary of Defense...... The Secretary of Defense shall manage the DoD’s response to any acts or threats of terrorism....."
('Military Assistance to Civil Authorities', Department of Defense Directive No 3025.15, February 18, 1997 )

In reporting the nature of his interaction with the Vice President Rumsfeld confirms he was out of the loop when it came to the President allegedly giving authority for a shoot-down.

Rumsfeld confirms in his account of the Mayaguez incident that as far back as 1975 the White House itself was able to have direct contact with pilots of US military aircraft. This contrasts starkly with the apparently dysfunctional communications systems for Air Force One and the Pentagon on 911 which cut the FAA and the President out of the Defense response loop.

Whilst the 9/11 Commission reports (p 44) the astonishing claim by Rumsfeld that he didn't have "situational awareness" on 911 until 10:39, the ability to draw fast conclusions which had apparently completely abandoned the Secretary of Defense in the morning suddenly made a miraculous return in the afternoon.  According to the report  (p 334/335): "On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible. The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not only Bin Ladin. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party."

For those prepared to read the detail of the official 9/11 report the situation is transparent. In the morning Rumsfeld failed to act against the hijackers when the evidence was massive, and in the afternoon he looking to act to act against Saddam Hussein when the evidence was non-existent. Even if the 9/11 Commission has studiously avoided drawing any explicit conclusions about the real reasons for the failure of America's defences during the hijacking attacks the relevant events of the day as diffusely recorded  in its own report speak for themselves.

Twelfth Public Hearing

(Of the eleven page statement five paragraphs deal with what General Myers did on  911)

This means that the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense was not available to them until after the Pentagon had been hit on 911. During this period (from just after the first strike on New York until just after the strike on Washington) Myers was in a meeting on Capitol Hill discussing non-urgent matters not related in any way to the emergency in progress. Myers knew about the first strike on New York as he went into the meeting which appears to have continued as planned.

Moreover the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has a very specific role to play during terrorist attacks as prescribed by protocol:
"The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism may be requested only by the President (or in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives) and must be authorized by the President. All requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must also be approved by the Secretary of Defense...... The Secretary of Defense shall manage the DoD’s response to any acts or threats of terrorism..... The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall assist the Secretary of Defense when he or she is implementing the DoD operational response to acts or threats of terrorism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall at all times maintain contingency plans for use in counterterrorism situations....."
('Military Assistance to Civil Authorities', Department of Defense Directive No 3025.15, February 18, 1997 )

So where was Myers' contingency plan for handling terrorist emergencies involving aviation given the report published in USA Today, 18 April 2004 entitled 'NORAD had drills of jets as weapons'? 

If NORAD had contingency plans to tackle suicide hijackings, where was Myer's own contingency plan for him to assist the Secretary of Defense in responding to them when they arose?

After 9/11 Myers was not reprimanded for dereliction of duty. Rather he was promoted.

In what way did these exercises focus on the "interagency coordination and decision-making" referred to by General Myers?

"Another exercise scheduled [pre-911] for November 2001 portrayed a terrorist threat to the Pentagon requiring evacuation of the facility and conducting operations from a relocation site."

The NMCC did not receive any requests for fighter scramblings on 911 as required by the relevant protocols.

The President's Daily Brief of 6 August referred to hijackings and that Bin Laden was determined to attack within the US.

If Eberhart contacted Myers (or someone with him) on Capitol Hill via a cell phone then how was it that nobody else did?

Eberhart was not at the Pentagon on 911 (he was at or in the vicinity of NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado - p 42 of the report) so it appears no one from the Pentagon contacted Myers whilst he was on Capitol Hill.

The Department of Defense press release also states that "On Sept. 11, Myers was vice chairman. He was sworn in as chairman {of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Oct. 1. His predecessor, Army Gen. Henry Shelton, was 'somewhere over the Atlantic' en route to Europe when the attacks occurred, so it was critical for Myers to get back to the Pentagon."

The press release confirms the critical role of Myers in the response to the attacks, yet he was apparently unavailable during the most critical period of the emergency.

The following circumstances are therefore apparent:
1. The relevant protocol identifies the key role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in assisting the Secretary of Defense "when he or she is implementing the DoD operational response to acts or threats of terrorism".
2. Myers was acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911.
3. Myers went into his non-essential meeting on Capitol Hill knowing that the first crash into the World Trade Centre had taken place after a summer of high terrorist threat alerts to American civil aviation.
4. He did not emerge from his meeting until around 9:38 at the earliest.
5. During this time no-one contacted General Myers to inform him that the World Trade Centre had been hit again at 9:03 even though at 9:05 the President had been told by his Chief of Staff that 'America is under attack'.

In addition to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the relevant protocol allocates specific responsibilities to the President regarding "The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism".

When a President of the United States ("The Commander In Chief") is told the country is "under attack" why would he not contact his Secretary of Defense and his most senior adviser in the military - the Chairman or acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? There is no evidence of any such contact on 911 before 10:00 and even then discussion with Rumsfeld was 'brief' and of such seemingly insignificant nature that neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense can apparently remember the content.

Before going into the meeting on Capital Hill why did Myers not ask to be kept informed of developments given the high level of threat warnings "clearly indicating a major Al Qaida terrorist operation was pending" that he acknowledges elsewhere in his statement were arising that summer?

If the original threat reporting was supposedly unspecific before 911 by the time Myers went into his meeting on Capitol Hill that morning things were getting very specific. As Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage put it in an interview broadcast by the BBC 20 August 2002 "I was seated in this very room, and my executive assistant came in and said one of the towers in New York had been hit by an aircraft. I ran in there, immediately picked up the phone and called to the assistant secretary for counter-terrorism. Even before the second airplane went in, I thought it was impossible to have this happen actually on a clear day and said, 'We've got a problem.' "

"When I arrived at the Pentagon, I spoke briefly with Secretary Wolfowitz on my way into the building; he was on his way to an alternate location. After I reached the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I asked questions to determine where Secretary Rumsfeld was, how the FAA was handling airborne flights, and the status of fighters prepared to intercept any hijacked aircraft inbound to Washington."

We are not told why Wolfowitz was leaving the Pentagon or where he was going.

Twelfth Public Hearing

"Approximately two months prior to 11 September 2001, I assumed duties as the Deputy for Command Center Operations in the J3 Directorate of the Joint Staff. In this role, I was responsible for the maintenance, operation, and training of watch teams for the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Further, I qualified in August 2001 to stand watch as the Deputy Director for Operations in the NMCC. On 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U. S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on the following day. I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001.  The details of the Air Threat Conference are contained in the conference transcript. I was given the opportunity to review this transcript during testimony I gave to members of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States staff on 29 April 2004. On that date, I recounted my actions as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on 11 September 2001. Shortly after assuming duty, I received the first report of a plane’s striking the World Trade Center. Some time after, I learned of the second plane’s collision with the World Trace Center. In response to these events, I convened a Significant Event Conference, which was subsequently upgraded to an Air Threat Conference. During the Air Threat Conference, Brigadier General Winfield relieved me and reassumed duties as Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center."

Leidig's statement is very short. He says he gave full testimony about what he did on 9/11 to the commission on 29 April 2004 (if this testimony is available on the Commission's web site it is not to be found by using name 'Leidig' in the site's search facility).

More details of some of his oral evidence provided during this twelfth hearing are given above. They are cause for concern. Leidig is not mentioned at all the 9/11 final report except in the footnotes. The same applies to Brigadier General Winfield. Given the absolutely pivotal role of these two individuals at the very point in the chain of command which failed on 911 (i.e. the sanctioned interface between the FAA and the military prescribed for handling a hijacking), this is 'surprising'. Leidig was asked  by General Winfield on 10 September to stand a portion of his duty on 11 September. In the event that portion coincided with the main period of the attacks. Winfield left quarter of an hour before the first strike on the WTC and returned around the end of the fourth hijacking which terminated in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 (there appears to be no testimony from General Winfield on the Commission's web site using a search on his name).

According to Newsweek 24 September 2001 "On Sept. 10.... a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns."

This was the second time Newsweek had reported this. On 13 September 2001 it asked "Could the bombers have been stopped? NEWSWEEK has learned that while U.S. intelligence received no specific warning, the state of alert had been high during the past two weeks, and a particularly urgent warning may have been received the night before the attacks, causing some top Pentagon brass to cancel a trip. Why that same information was not available to the 266 people who died aboard the four hijacked commercial aircraft may become a hot topic on the Hill."

If there were security concerns about September 11 within the Pentagon the day before it is unfortunate that Brigadier Winfield should have handed over to a relatively inexperienced deputy just as the first hijacking was getting under way and that he did not return until a late stage in the events. According to Leidig's oral testimony at the twelfth hearing "I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield. Right after we resolved what was going on with United 93, around that time General Winfield took over."

According to ABC News 14 September 2001 "In dozens of exclusive interviews with ABCNEWS, Congressional leaders told of chaos on Capitol Hill, Cabinet secretaries described a war council deep in a secret bunker beneath the White House, generals and sergeants told of how they ramped up for a possible nuclear strike, and the president and vice president were said to have ordered U.S. pilots to shoot down any planes threatening the nation's capital..... 'When the second aircraft flew into the second tower, it was at that point that we realized that the seemingly unrelated hijackings that the FAA was dealing with were in fact a part of a coordinated terrorist attack on the United States,' said Army Brig. Gen. W. Montague Winfield, who was at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, and alerted the top brass there."

Except that Leidig's testimony now shows that he wasn't and he didn't.

Following 911 both Leidig and Winfield were nominated by the President for promotion.

Investigative journalist Tom Flocco had been a regular attendee at the Commission's public hearings. In an online article 17 June 2004 he reported that "In May, 2003 the Commission was informed that the Pentagon had taped the Significant Event/Air Threat conference call during the attacks; and after repeated requests, the Pentagon created a classified transcript. (US News, 9-8-2003)  On August 6, the White House conducted what was termed an 'executive privilege' review of the transcript for the phone bridge conference-call in order to censor the document, likely for 'national security' reasons."

The 9/11 Commission's final report only provides brief details in relation to the conference-call.

Flocco also reports that: "President Bush is attended by a round-the-clock Secret Service detail which would of necessity been connected to the secure phone bridge conference lines. Most Americans think that President Bush first became aware of the attacks when his Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered in his ear at 9:06 am at the elementary school while he was meeting with the first graders. Facts indicate otherwise. Laura Brown, Public Affairs Director at the FAA, initially told this writer at the first 9-11 hearing in Washington that the phone bridges started around 8:20 or 8:25 am, which would be reasonable since American 11 was determined to be hijacked at 8:13, 8:20 or 8:24 am. This, depending upon which news report, official, or air traffic controller is referenced--and to what extent one permits the government to shorten the official time-line of the actual attacks, thus reducing potential culpability should a grand jury ever be impaneled. After returning to her office and conferring with superiors, Brown sent an email to this writer later that same evening after 7:00 pm, revising her initial assertions for the commencement of Leidig’s phone bridges to around 8:45 am, thus shortening the official attack time-line to the government's advantage."

Twelfth Public Hearing

"On the morning of September 11th, the first indication to the FAA Headquarters of a potential problem was sometime after 8:30am when our Air Traffic office in HQ received a report that an American airlines aircraft had a communication problem. The Boston Center was aware that AA-11 was in distress and had started the process for a possible hijacked aircraft. Our air traffic personnel in the HQ immediately began to gather information from the field facilities. My first knowledge of a problem that morning was upon my return to my office from a meeting in the FAA HQ building. I was advised that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. I immediately went into the FAA Operations center and began to gather information. The initial reports to me were unclear—we did not immediately know that AA-11 had crashed into the World Trade Center. We launched into an information gathering response in HQ. Our Air Traffic HQ group established communications with the field facilities to get as much information as quickly as possible. And the tactical communications net, managed by FAA Security, was established in the Washington Operations Center to link HQ with other FAA facilities. I contacted the FAA Administrator who was in a meeting at the Department of Transportation and she immediately returned to the FAA building. During this time period I had several phone conversations with Sec. Mineta and his Chief of Staff. I was on the phone with his Chief of Staff when the second aircraft hit the Trade When UAL 175 crashed into the second tower it was clear that we were dealing with deliberate actions..... Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA’s security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements. On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD. Although the FAA had letters of agreement with DOD [Department of Defense] and the FBI which defined procedures to follow and roles and responsibilities, it became clear that the events of 9/11 went far beyond the scope of those existing agreements..... Some of the major actions taken in the FAA Headquarters were... The FAA security organization... participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies.... After 9/11 the most significant improvement needed was establishing a direct communications link between FAA facilities, DOD, and NORAD. We could no longer rely on communication to NORAD through our Headquarters or through the NMCC."

Mr Belger confirms to the Commission that pre-911 the standard channel for obtaining a fighter escort for a hijacking was a request submitted to the NMCC and that the "FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements."

Why isn't Belger quoted on this in the final 9/11 Commission report?

No one disputes the fact that the events of 911 were extraordinary but Belger does not explain why no fighter escort requests for any of the stricken aircraft were put through to the NMCC by FAA headquarters during the course of the hijackings on 911. Why would the events of 911 justify breaching protocol and providing a lesser response than for previous 'normal' and less serious hijacking alerts?

Belger says "On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD". But the relevant protocol specifies that NORAD is required to set up such communications once a request for military assistance has been made by the FAA via the NMCC. No such requests were issued on 911.

However, Belger does confirm that "The FAA security organization was participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies".

Belger also states "After 9/11 the most significant improvement needed was establishing a direct communications link between FAA facilities, DOD, and NORAD. We could no longer rely on communication to NORAD through our Headquarters or through the NMCC."

Belger doesn't explain why that link failed but he does identify it as the most significant factor in the failed response on 911. Clearly a further investigation is needed to provide an explanation.

However, in his oral evidence Belger did elaborate as follows: "Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft, as I said, were in place and pretty well tested.... The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC.... It is clear I think in the record that at 9:20 the FAA operations center did call the National Military Command Center and add them into the hijacking net. I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.... this is very, very important, in response to your question.... at 9:20, the NMCC was called. They were added to this open communication net. In my 30 years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net.... Real-time information.... I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but  it is a fact -- [I repeat] there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney [FAA Command Center’s national operations manager] said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on. "

Mr Belger's observations here are not relayed in the Commission's final report.

Apart from the near total inaction of Rumsfeld and Myers during the attacks this conclusion appears to go right to the heart of the failed response on 9/11. Why did the communication between FAA HQ and the NMCC fail on 911, on the very day it was most needed, when Mr Belger confirms the system had worked satisfactorily in the past with "frequent" requests for such assistance? Why were communications by FAA HQ on 911working easily with the "intelligence agencies" but not with the NMCC?

From this description it is apparent that the "intelligence agencies" had a direct line into the FAA security organisation, the body managing the Washington Operations Centre and responsible for linking HQ with other FAA facilities during the emergency.

It would also appear that FAA conversations with the "intelligence agencies" on 911 remain classified.

Twelfth Public Hearing

"This testimony is provided at the request of the Commission to be made part of the record and carefully studied by the Commission..... Upon learning of the first aircraft 'hitting' the World Trade Center, Air Traffic Services called the Headquarters management team together and began preparing to address an aircraft accident. When word of the second aircraft 'hitting' the World Trade Center was received, Air Traffic Services set up a situation line with all Regional Air Traffic Division Managers, large facility managers and the Command Center. The purpose of this line was to have real-time information flowing to/from field elements. One person was designated to immediately start the data collection process, including radar plots and voice recordings. I assumed a role in the Washington Operations Center. In the Washington Operations Center, a direct communications line was set up to the Air Traffic Control System Command Center. This line became the real-time source of information on aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations...."

Mr Griffith appears anxious to encourage the Commissioners to consider his report 'carefully'.

"In Headquarters, Air Traffic Services set up an additional situation room in the front office that was occupied by DOD [Department of Defense] liaison officers who worked on the Air Traffic Services Headquarters staff."

Who were those DOD liaison officers stationed in FAA HQ and what was the role of their "additional" situation room?

What part, if any, did these military officers play in the failure of FAA HQ to submit requests to the NMCC for air support on 911?

According to oral evidence given in the same session as Mr Griffith by the FAA's Command Center’s national operations manager Mr  Ben Sliney: "... at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.... If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military."

The apparent implication of these remarks is that it was the military cell at the FAA Command Centre that was responsible for failing to notify the hijack assistance requests to the NMCC and not the FAA.

Despite their potential importance Mr Sliney's observations here are not relayed in the Commission's final report.

"In the Washington Operations Center, key personnel were assigned to multiple coordination positions with direct telephone communications to other Government agency key personnel. There were also other 'secure' lines established to coordinate with certain organizations. One of these organizations was the National Military Command Center. As information was received from the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center on aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations over the direct communications line, that information was announced to all key personnel coordinating with other agencies. The key personnel would immediately provide this information to their counterpart on the phone line. The entire group was situated in a manner to facilitate this relay of information."

Given that the Washington Operations Center established a secure line with the NMCC, and given that the Washington Center had established a line with the Air Traffic Control System Command Centre (which according to Mr Griffith "became the real-time source of information on aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations...."), how could it be that the NMCC would not instruct NORAD to scramble fighters even if (inexplicably) it had not received a direct request from FAA HQ (if that is really what happened)?

Alternatively, if none was received, might the NMCC not at the very least have invited the FAA to make an urgent request if sticking to the letter of protocol was a concern even after the WTC had been hit ?

"At the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center, the military officers assigned to the Air Traffic Services Cell became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements."

Even though it was an FAA facility military officers "became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements."

This is another potentially very important statement which is not conveyed in the final report.

Who were these military officers and what role did they play, if any, in fighter escort requests failing to reach the NMCC for any of the hijacked planes on 911?

SUMMARY
CORRECT CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR  MILITARY AIRCRAFT ESCORT ASSISTANCE AS PART OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGS ON  9/11 ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PROTOCOLS
FAA > NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTRE  > PRESIDENT/ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE > NORAD > MILITARY  UNITs
ACTUAL CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING COURSE OF 9/11 HIJACKINGS AS DIFFUSELY DOCUMENTED BY THE OFFICIAL 9/11 REPORT
FAA  > SECRET SERVICE/VICE PRESIDENT  > MILITARY UNITs

"In the view of many the probability is high that Cheney sits at heart of why US defences were so easily breached on 911. His failure to testify in public reinforces the impression of a cover-up in motion. So what has the White House got to hide? Certainly there are many things left to investigate. There have been claims that no one envisioned hijacked airplanes being used as weapons. But we now know that several pre-911 intelligence reports were concerned with precisely that. Moreover a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCS1 3610.01A) on procedures relating to military response to hijackings was issued 11 June 2001. The 'Instruction' specifically envisions the possibility of the hijacking of US military aircraft carrying weapons of mass destruction - an even more extreme scenario than actually took place on 911..... It is, of course, also interesting that someone felt there was a need to review procedures for military responses to hijackings just three months before 911."
Rice Must Explain Pre-911 National Security Priorities
'Fight Smart', 5 April 2004

"In my new book I will establish that.... on the day of the attacks [Vice President Dick Cheney] was running a completely separate Command, Control and Communications system which was superceding any orders being issued by the FAA, the Pentagon, or the White House Situation Room ......"
Michael Ruppert, former Los Angeles Police Department investigator, on his new book
'Crossing The Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil'
to be published September 2004

More On This Emerging Controversy
Michael Ruppert Speaks On His New Book At The Prestigious Commonwealth Club Of California, America's Oldest And Largest Public Affairs Forum - September 2004 - Click Here
(Previous Speakers include Martin Luther King, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Bill Gates, James Woolsey, John Kerry, Joe Lieberman, Madeline Albright, Hans Blix and many other household names including two 9/11 Commissioners)

London Times - 26 January 2004
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www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/oilsectorfailstoreplenishreserves.htm
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